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Deconstructing Transnationalism:
Conceptualizing Metanationalism
as a Putative Model of Evolving
Jurisprudence
Paul Enriquez*

ABSTRACT

This Article builds upon Philip C. Jessup's revolutionary
scholarshipto pave new pathways for interdisciplinaryresearch
and expand the normative constitutional framework of
universal human problems. To that end, this Article ties
American constitutional theory to the new era of international
globalization andprovides context that facilitates the discussion
of racial and ethnic diversity in education from a domestic and
internationalperspective. By arguing for compelling treatment
of diversity in elementary and secondary learning institutions,
this Article introduces a new theory of constitutional
interpretation vis-&-vis international law. This theory, called
metanationalism,
rejects
Harold Koh's
theory
of
transnationalism and demonstrates that nationalism and
transnationalism are not two mutually exclusive concepts at
opposite ends of a linear spectrum of constitutional theory.
Contrary to Koh's postulate, metanationalism conceptualizes
these two theories as components in a multidimensional
paradigm where such theories exist to broaden and enrich legal
analysis. Applying metanationalism, this Article argues that
existing literature overlooks diversity's role in the global
education-rights movement and focuses on India as a case
study. Lastly, this Article analyzes a recent trend in U.S.
constitutional law to advocate revisiting the current equal
protection landscape.

* LL.M., International and Comparative Law, George Washington University Law
School. I thank David Fontana for a helpful conversation. Special thanks to U.S.
District Judge Philip R. Martinez for introducing me to the art of scholarly writing, and
Sean D. Murphy for his invaluable comments and suggestions at various stages of the
writing process, his enthusiasm for teaching, and his words of encouragement.
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The doctrine of human equality may be unpopular
with besotted ignorants, but, popular or unpopular, I
shall stand by it until I am relieved of the unprofitable
labors of such.
-Thaddeus Stevens'

INTRODUCTION

Five and a half decades ago, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme
Court rendered one of its most significant and controversial rulings to
date when it decided Brown v. Board of Education.2 After decades of
government-sponsored racial segregation, the Court unanimously
struck down the doctrine of "separate but equal" in public educational
facilities. 3 The Court emphasized the importance of education in our
society by reminding us that "[i]t is the very foundation of good
citizenship" and "a principal instrument in awakening [a] child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 4 Brown's
jurisprudence overturned nearly six decades of de jure5 segregation
and has become a virtuous emblem of the judiciary's ability to protect
the individual rights guaranteed in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Despite Brown's powerful mandate against racial discrimination,
total desegregation remains an unmet goal. 7 De jure segregation may
have been abolished, but many public schools remain de facto8

1.
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU,
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 238 (1997)

THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE
(citing JAMES WOODBURN, THE

OF THE
LIFE OF

THADDEUS STEVENS 428-29 (1913)). Stevens, a Representative from Pennsylvania,
uttered these words on September 4, 1866. Id.

2.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Id. at 495.
3.
4.
Id. at 493.
5.
"De jure" is Latin for "as a matter of law." Black's Law Dictionary defines
the term as "[e]xisting by right or according to law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 490 (9th
ed. 2009).
6.
Gerald N. Rosenberg, African-American Rights After Brown, in BLACK,
WHITE, AND BROWN 203, 208 (Clare Cushman & Melvin I. Urofsky eds., 2004).
7.
Diane E. Hess, Brown as a Classroom Icon, in BLACK, WHITE, AND BROWN,
supra note 6, at 275, 281.
8.
"De facto" is Latin for "in point of fact." Black's Law Dictionary defines the
term as "[a]ctual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally
recognized." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009).
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segregated due to pervasive residential segregation and white flight.9
To combat de facto segregation, several school districts recently
implemented voluntary integration programs, which sparked
litigation in the lower courts.10 The school districts, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,' urged the courts to
uphold the constitutionality of their race-conscious plans. However,
Grutter extends only to higher education,' 2 and its application to K12 admissions generated a stream of organized legal chaos.
Most people familiar with Brown and its progeny recognize the
aspiration of promoting racial and ethnic diversity,13 while

9.
Imany Perry, Holistic Integration: An Anniversary Reflection on the Goals
of Brown v. Board of Education, in LEGACIES OF BROWN 303, 304 (Dorinda J. Carter et
al. eds., 2004).
10.
See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 7-9 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (describing the Lynn School Committee's race-conscious voluntary transfer plan);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169-72 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (describing the Seattle School District's assignment plan designed
to ameliorate the effects of private housing segregation), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177
(2006); McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841-48 (W.D. Ky.
2004) (describing the Jefferson County Public School District's voluntary student
assignment plan for purposes of integration), affd per curian, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir.
2005), cert. granted sub. nom. Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178
(2006).
11.
539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law
School's race-conscious admissions plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because diversity constitutes a compelling government interest that justifies the
narrowly tailored use of race in the context of higher education).
12.
See discussion infra note 424.
13.
Diversity, as referred to in this Article, denotes the differences among
people. For many decades after independence, the United States' public schools
operated on a dual system that served as a barrier for racial diversity and inclusion.
Carl A. Grant, Diversity and Inclusion in the United States: The Dual Structures that
Prevent Equality, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY AND
INCLUSION: STUDIES FROM AMERICA, EUROPE, AND INDIA 47, 52-53 (Gajendra K. Verma
et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES]. After the Civil War,

group distinctions in the United States shifted to focus mainly on race and ethnicity.
Today, "racial and ethnic diversity" among individuals is a term that is generally used
to depict a mixture of individuals from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Most of
the current diversity literature classifies minority groups as White, Black, Latino,
Asian, or Other. However, this system of classification does not adequately portray
diversity in the United States. Even within these overinclusive umbrella categories for
minorities, each group is diverse in its own way. For example, Latinos are a group
comprised of Spanish-speaking peoples from the Caribbean, Spain, and Central and
South America. Approximately 62 percent of Latinos in the United States are of
Mexican origin (mainly concentrated in California, Texas, Florida, and New York), 13
percent are of Puerto Rican origin (mostly inhabiting the New York City metropolitan
area), 5 percent are of Cuban origin (mostly residing in the Miami area), 12 percent are
of Central or South American origin, and 8 percent are from Spain or other places.
MICHAEL BENJAMIN, CULTURAL DIVERSITY,
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 53 (1996). The Asian category is noticeably

more diverse. In 2000, 23 percent of Asians in the United States were of Chinese
origin, while 19 percent were Filipino, 16 percent South Asian (Indian), 12 percent
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simultaneously eliminating segregation, as a distinctively American
problem. Yet, contrary to this belief, an examination of law and
public policy in nations around the world reveals that diversity in
education-as well as in other areas-has become a global
predicament. This is precisely the type of dilemma identified by
Philip C. Jessup, the late jurist and scholar, when he published a
series of lectures contained in his groundbreaking volume
TransnationalLaw. Jessup explored the universal nature of human
problems to challenge the traditional approach to relationships
between nation-states, as well as between states and non-state
actors. 14 Jessup's exposition of the complex and interrelated world
community in which we live constitutes the genesis of this Article.
In broad terms, this Article examines the constitutional
framework of racial and ethnic diversity in K-12 public education
from an equal protection standpoint.
Namely, it argues for
constitutional compelling treatment of diversity and integration in
education that survives strict judicial scrutiny. To advocate a
normative framework inclusive of diversity, the greater part of this
Article ties American constitutional theory to the new era of
international globalization. By using diversity as a "universal human
problem," this Article builds upon Jessup's revolutionary scholarship
to challenge
the
current
binary construct
(nationalismtransnationalism) advanced by Professor Harold Koh and
conceptualizes a solution as a putative model of evolving

jurisprudence.
This Article makes three distinct contributions to legal
scholarship. First, it introduces metanationalism,' 5 a novel theory of
constitutional interpretation vis-A-vis international law. This term
has not appeared in prior literature but borrows from Jessup's own
experiment in word coining.
When Jessup coined the term
"transnational law,"' 6 he understood that a particular choice of

Japanese, 11 percent Korean, 8 percent Indo-Chinese, and 16 percent belonged to other
subgroups including Polynesians, Indonesians, and Malays. Id. at 71. Similarly, Blacks
come from the African continent, but also from the Caribbean and South America. Id.
at 23. As is evident in the generalization of minority classifications, American society
appears to be more comfortable categorizing people in broad terms. In reality, the
cultural, linguistic, religious, and social distinctions of each subgroup illustrate the
abundant diversity found in the United States.
14.
PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 3 (1956).
15.
The prefix "meta" in this context denotes a concept (1) situated beyond or in
succession to; (2) "later or more highly organized or specialized"; and (3) "more
comprehensive . . . used with the name of a discipline to designate a new but related
discipline designed to deal critically with the original one." Meta, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meta (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010). For a detailed discussion of metanationalism, see infra Part III.C.
16.
"Transnational law" includes "all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as
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terminology might appear unsatisfactory to some.17 Nevertheless, he
exercised his scholarly freedom, recognizing that "[t]he more wedded
we become to a particular classification or definition, the more our
thinking tends to become frozen and thus to have a rigidity which
hampers progress toward the ever needed new solutions of problems
whether old or new."1 8 Ultimately, however, while articulating a
term is necessary from a methodological standpoint, this Article is
more concerned with paving new pathways for interdisciplinary
research and expanding the normative constitutional framework.
In essence, the metanationalist approach is twofold. First, it
rejects Koh's theory of transnationalism.
More specifically, this
rejection focuses on transnationalists' overemphasis on respecting
only the laws of "mature" or "developed" societies. Such limitation is
problematic because it requires a subjective measuring of
jurisprudential maturity, fosters unnecessary debate over the citation
of international sources, and creates a veil of international
majoritarianism.1 9 Second, the metanationalist approach replaces
Koh's linear model with a multidimensional paradigm for
interpreting international law. Simply put, instead of thinking of
nationalism and transnationalism as two mutually exclusive concepts
at opposite ends of a linear spectrum of constitutional interpretation,
metanationalism views these concepts as important elements in a
multidimensional plane where theories exist to broaden and enrich
legal analysis.
This concept is similar to the substitution of
normative linear models in other disciplinary areas such as human
sexuality (adding bisexual, transsexual, pansexual, intersexual, and
asexual to the original homosexual and heterosexual linear model)
and political theory (replacing the conservative and liberal linear
model with a diverse plane that includes classifications such as
totalitarian, libertarian, socialist, anarchist, and communist).
The second independent contribution in this Article stems from
the application of metanationalist principles in a comparative
analysis of the role of diversity in India's education-rights movement.
Until now, the bulk of literature in this field of human rights law has

are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories." JESSUP, supra
note 14, at 2. As Jessup acknowledged in his work, he did not invent the term
transnational law; scholars before him had used the term repeatedly. See id. at 2 n.3.
Indeed, the term transnational first appeared in literature during World War I in an
essay written by Randolph Bourne. See Randolph Bourne, Trans-National America,
118 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 86, 97 (1916) (discussing the failure of the melting pot theory
while advancing his view of America's destiny as a cosmopolitan mixture of cultures).
Nevertheless, Jessup successfully conceptualized transnational law in its present
meaning.
17.
JESSUP, supra note 14, at 2.
18.
Id. at 7.
19.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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focused on an international consensus-found in treaties and other
international agreements-regarding the importance of education as
a basic human right.
However, a closer examination of the
emergence of education as a fundamental right in India-first
through jurisprudence and later by means of a constitutional
mandate 20-reveals a crucial factor largely absent from the scholarly
debate: diversity.
This Article argues that diversity played a
significant role in securing a constitutional amendment, primarily
resulting from the desire to eradicate illiteracy and extend
educational opportunities to the poor and socially deprived. With
that background, this Article demonstrates some of the ways that
India-and other nations-treats diversity as a compelling interest
that justifies measures to integrate pupils from different races,
castes, and cultures in educational facilities.
The third contribution in this Article focuses on two new
developments in American constitutional law. The first development
is a trend in equal protection law that has altered the nature of strict
scrutiny.
For decades, remedial measures
against past
discrimination constituted the only exception-or compelling
interest-to justify the limited use of race under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 1 However, this Article identifies four-and potentially
six-new compelling interests that have arisen in recent
jurisprudence.22 Similarly, the second development originates from
evolving jurisprudence in the Supreme Court's interpretation of
international law. This evolution, which inspired metanationalism,
substantiates the notion that diversity-under the mantle of
globalization-constitutes a "global" compelling interest.
Together, these developments support carving a new integration
exception to the Fourteenth Amendment to resolve the quandary
begot by the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS). 23 Indeed,
when the Court granted certiorari in PICS, 24 it set out to answer,
once and for all, whether diversity constitutes a compelling interest
that justifies the limited preferential use of race in K-12 admissions.

20.
India's judiciary established education as a protected right in 1993. In
2002, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment to the same effect. For an
overview of case law and the events leading to the constitutional amendment, see infra
Part III.D.
21.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
749 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the Court had previously
authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation).
22.
See discussion infra Part IV.
23.
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701.
24.
PICS consolidated Parents Involved in Community Schools u. Seattle School
District No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177, and Meredith u. Jefferson County Board of Education,
547 U.S. 1178. See 551 U.S. 701.
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Unfortunately, instead of bringing much needed guidance and closure
to a controversial area of the law, the Court's fragmented decision left
the equal protection status of race-based integration programs in a
state of disarray. Diversity in early education can teach children to
function in a pluralistic society;2 5 but more importantly, it can
provide a path to eradicate the need for controversial and polarizing
preferential policies. If everyone starts with the same opportunities,
states would find it difficult to justify favorable discrimination on
racial grounds. The Court's failure to articulate a majority rationale
for the importance of diversity in primary and secondary education is
worth revisiting.2 6 In times of uncertainty, the United States needs a
Supreme Court that asserts its authority to render judgment on the
most difficult constitutional questions of its time. That was the case
in Brown, where the Court unanimously veered the country in the
right course after decades of having strayed from it.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the case law that
sets the stage for Grutterand PICS. Part II discusses the educational
and social benefits that flow from diversity in education. Part III
examines, from an international perspective, the constitutional
framework of diversity in education. A section of Part III analyzes
recent efforts in social architecture to further diversity in the
international community, with particular emphasis on India, the
most populous democracy on Earth. Additionally, Part III discusses
the globalization phenomenon and introduces the theory of
metanationalism. To illustrate metanationalisn at work, Part III
provides a constitutional analysis and argues that the existing
literature overlooks the role of diversity in India's education-rights
movement. Finally, Part IV reconciles Parts I, II, and III and
suggests a new approach to equal protection jurisprudence that
considers the importance of diversity from a domestic and global
standpoint, the effects of globalization on diversity in education
across the world, Grutter's inapplicability to the K-12 context, and
two new trends in American constitutional law.

25.
See discussion infra Part II.
26.
Indeed, the plurality opinion avoids the more pressing constitutional
question. Instead of addressing the compelling nature of diversity in the K 12 setting,
the plurality dodged the question by finding that the integration plans violated the
second prong of strict scrutiny. The plurality explained that they did not need to
resolve the question of whether racial diversity constitutes a compelling interest under
the Fourteenth Amendment because it was "clear that the racial classifications
employed by the districts [were] not narrowly tailored . . . ." Parents Intolved, 551 U.S.
at 726 (plurality opinion). But cf. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 892 (2010) ("It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument
just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. Indeed, a
court would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle
merely to avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling.").
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I. TURMOIL IN THE COURTS

Despite Brown's landmark constitutional jurisprudence and its
effects on the elimination of de jure segregation, the war against
racial discrimination remains far from over. Litigation continues to
provide a framework for integration, but social reform moves slowly. 27
In the American system of separated powers, courts are severely
constrained.2 8 As a result, the judiciary has struggled to distinguish
desegregation from integration.29
Desegregation concentrates
exclusively on student reassignment to ensure that a school district
has a balanced racial mix.30 Integration goes a step further and uses
changed racial composition as a mere starting point to restructure the
basis of an educational system. 3 ' Integration of a desegregated school
system requires not only a good administrative structure, but also
positive attitudes among people of different racial and ethnic
groups.3 2 Brown led to the successful desegregation of American
schools, but turned a blind eye on the issue of integration.
A. The Path to Grutter
1.

Brown Triumphs Over Segregation

From the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth
century, Plessy v. Ferguson3 3 and the doctrine of separate but equal
dominated equal protection jurisprudence. By the 1950s, as the
United States sought to increase its influence in the international
community at the beginning of the Cold War, it encountered criticism
for its racially discriminatory policies. 34 News organizations around
the world-especially in Asia and Africa-condemned the United
States for its segregation policies and highlighted the irony that a
country advocating for democracy around the world could not even
support democracy on its own soil.35 International pressure, coupled
with efforts led by Thurgood Marshall and the National Association

27.
Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 232-33.
28.
Id. at 232.
29.
David L. Kirp, Race, Politics, and the Courts, in LEGACIES OF BROWN, supra
note 9, at 41, 59.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
33.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34.
Catherine Prendergast, The Economy of Literacy, in LEGACIES OF BROWN,
supra note 9, at 181, 187.
Id.
35.
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for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to eliminate segregation
in higher education, set the stage for Brown.3 6
Brown arrived at the Supreme Court as one of four consolidated
state cases involving racial segregation in K-12 public schools.3 7 The
Court unanimously concluded "that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.3 8
Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."39 The ruling affirmed
that racial distinctions under the law are morally suspect and lack
any constitutional legitimacy. 40 The historical impact of the Court's
decision transcended international barriers and attracted worldwide
attention. 41
However, despite Brown's cogency and moral
transparency, the ruling did little or nothing to address integration,
racial inequities, and poverty in public schools. 42 Desegregation in
the school systems became compulsory, but the judiciary's solution to
the segregation crisis proved inadequate to ameliorate the problems
of poor and minority school systems. 43
2.

Freeman Cripples Brown

The Supreme Court's mandate to desegregate schools with "all
deliberate speed" 44 generated pervasive resistance that changed the
country's demographic landscape. 45
Residential segregation
advanced hastily and "white flight" created areas where the
population was almost entirely composed of minorities. 46 The Court

36.
See Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial
Integration in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 318
(1952) (advocating for desegregation in American higher education).
37.
Brown originated in Kansas. The three other cases were Briggs v. Elliot,
342 U.S. 350 (1952), from South Carolina; Davis v. Cnty Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952), from Virginia; and Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), from
Delaware. In addition, a fifth companion case to Brown involving public school
segregation in the District of Columbia was decided the same day. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
38.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
39.
40.
JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING WIND 329 (1999).
41.
Id. at 328.
42.
MARY F. EHRLANDER, EQUAL
ELUSIVE MANDATE 271 (Eric Rise ed., 2002).

EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY:

BROWN'S

Id.
43.
44.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown l1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
45.
EHRLANDER, supra note 42, at 275.
46.
Id. at 275-76. "White flight" refers to the exodus of whites from inner cities
to suburbia. "White exodus had occurred at vastly different rates, but research showed
that as blacks and other minorities moved into neighborhoods, especially after the
percentage surpassed the 'comfort zone' for whites (10-20 percent minority), whites
began to leave, seeking homes in suburbs, where they were surrounded by other
whites." Id.
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addressed this racial imbalance in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education.47 In that case, the Court unanimously held that
school districts have "an affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."4 8 Swann
vested courts with broad power to prescribe desegregation plans in
educational policy, but it conditioned its scope on proof of a
constitutional violation and failure of school officials to comply with
the Fourteenth Amendment. 49
The Supreme Court entered a new chapter in school
desegregation when it began releasing school districts from court
supervision. 0 In 1992, Freeman v. Pitts considered whether a district
court could withdraw judicial supervision over a school district-the
Dekalb County School System (DCSS)-that had complied with a
desegregation decree and implemented a comprehensive integration
plan. 51
Freeman examined DCSS's efforts to combat massive
demographic changes that resulted in de facto segregation. 52 Once
again, a unanimous Court held that "[r]acial balance is not to be
achieved for its own sake," unless the imbalance is the direct result of
a constitutional violation.53 The Court further declared that:
Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been
remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that
is caused by demographic factors.... It is beyond the authority and
beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract
54
these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts.

47.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).

48.
49.

Id. at 15 (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)).
Id. at 16. The Court in Swann explicitly stated,

in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school [could]
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for
the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional
violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court.
Id.
50.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (deciding to release a
school district from supervision if it has, in good faith, complied with a court's
desegregation decree); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (holding that
courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control over a school district
that has complied with a court's order).
51.
503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
52.

KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION

ERA 217 (2005). By 1986, "[o]ver 50% of African-American [DCSS] students attended
schools that were over 90% black, and 62% of them attended schools that were at least
67% black." Id.
53.
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.
Id. at 494-95.
54.
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School districts should not be subject to perpetual supervision "simply
because they were once de jure segregated."5 5
Freeman made it clear that the purpose of Brown and its progeny
was to eradicate de jure segregation and its vestiges. 56 Residential
segregation caused by private housing demographics would not be
remedied by racial balancing, unless it could be traced to state
action.5 7 Freeman's effect on desegregation rendered a legal blow to
Brown's legacy by implicitly permitting a reversal of desegregation
initiatives in unlawfully segregated school systems, provided that the
reversal did not originate with the intent to discriminate. 58 In
essence, Freeman held that "[d]e facto segregation of school districts
after they have been declared unitary lies outside the scope of judicial
remedy." 5

3.

Diversity Ignites Hullabaloo in Bakke's Oven

The 1990s brought an end to the era of court-ordered
desegregation.6 0 The release of school districts from judicial custody
made it increasingly difficult to define or predict the type of
integration policies, if any, that would withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 6 ' The end of de jure segregation in the post-Brown era gave
birth to the question of whether diversity constitutes a compelling
governmental interest in public education that would justify
preferential treatment on the basis of race.6 2 The Supreme Court
considered this exact question in Grutter,63 although this case arose
in the narrow context of higher education. Grutter sent shockwaves
through the equal protection landscape when it upheld, by a 5-4
majority, the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action
programs. 64

55.
Id. at 495; see also Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (holding that desegregation
decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetuity").
56.

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485.

57.
BROwN, supra note 52, at 219.
58.
Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining
of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147, 161 (1993).
59.
Id. at 164 (citing Kevin Brown, Termination ofPublic School Desegregation:
Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Iwidious Value
Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 n.7 (1990)).
60.
EHRLANDER, supra note 42, at 284-85.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
63.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 359 U.S. 306 (2003). For a more detailed
discussion of Grutter,see infra Part IV.A.
64.
Paul J. Beard II, The Legacy of Grutter: How the Meredith and PICS
Courts Wrongly Extended the "Educational Benefits" Exception to the Equal Protection
Clause in Public Higher Education, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (2006).
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The origins of Grutter, however, trace back almost a quarter
century earlier. Litigation flourished as many institutions of higher
education began to experiment with granting minority students
preferential treatment to achieve racial equality.65 In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of affirmative action in education. 6 6 The case involved a
constitutional challenge to the University of California at Davis
Medical School's race-conscious admissions program.67
The
University implemented a dual-admissions policy under which
sixteen out of a total one hundred seats were reserved exclusively for
individuals from minority groups. 68 White individuals competed for
the remaining eighty-four seats.6 9 The Court held, by a narrow 5-4
majority, that the race-based program operated as a quota and
violated the Equal Protection Clause.7 0
Bakke's ruling failed to clarify the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs in higher education, but it placed diversity at the
summit of the constitutional scale.7 1 Writing alone, Justice Powell
declared that the attainment of diversity in higher education
constitutes a compelling governmental interest that justifies the use
of race as one factor among many.72 Powell based his reasoning on
the relationship between diversity and academic freedom under the
First Amendment.7 3 This innovative approach reflected the notion
that "[a]ny award generated by the operation of diversity ... is not
meant to restore a loss to anyone . . . but to recognize and pursue a

value that is highly prized in our society-free speech, with all its
recognized aims." 74

65.
66.
67.
68.

JAMES A. BECKMAN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION Now 15 (2006).
438 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1978).
Id. at 269.
Id. at 275-76.

69.

Id.

70.
71.

Id. at 316-17.
Bakke generated six separate opinions encompassing three major coalitions

on the viability of affirmative action plans. One bloc of four Justices believed using race

as a preferential factor in any admissions decision was unconstitutional. BECKMAN,
supra note 65, at 17-18. A second bloc of four Justices deemed race-based admissions
plans constitutional if used to improve diversity or further any other important
government interest. Id. at 18. Justice Powell was the crucial swing vote and joined
both blocs on different points. Id. He joined the first bloc to strike down the plans as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also joined the second bloc to hold that
better drafted, more narrowly tailored, and less exclusionary plans might be
permissible under different circumstances. Id. Powell's plurality opinion did not speak
for the majority of the Court, but it articulated what has become Bakke's diversity
rationale. Id.
72.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
Id. at 312.
73.
74.
W. ROBERT GRAY, THE FOUR FACES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
FUNDAMENTAL ANSWERS AND ACTIONS 40 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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Justice Powell's diversity rationale was the product of his own
legal reasoning and did not create binding precedent.75 However, his
lone opinion "served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of
race-conscious admissions policies."76 Twenty-five years after Bakke,
a majority of the Court endorsed, for the first time in history, Powell's
view that student-body diversity is a compelling state interest that
warrants the narrowly tailored use of race in higher-education
admissions.7 7
B. Lower Courts Struggle with Diversity
As courts struggled to keep Brown's spirit of racial equality alive,
new legal battles were fought in the context of voluntary school
assignment plans designed to encourage integration and avoid de
facto segregation. A handful of courts examined the constitutionality
of race-based K-12 plans prior to Grutter and found a compelling
governmental interest to further diversity.7 8 Grutter finally provided
lower courts some guidance regarding the constitutional analysis for
race-conscious plans. However, that guidance was narrow because
Grutter applied explicitly to higher education.7 9 As a result, lower
courts undertook the intricate task of applying Grutter's
jurisprudence to the K-12 setting.80 The outcomes of these decisions

75.
BECKMAN, supra note 65, at 18.
76.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
77.
Id. at 325.
78.
See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir.
2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a race-based transfer program intended to
reduce racial isolation in participating schools); Tuttle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195
F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (striking down a race-weighed lottery admissions policy
implemented by the Arlington County School Board and designed to promote racial
diversity); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063
(9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that a laboratory elementary school's admissions policy, which
considered race and ethnicity to obtain a desired student population, met the demands
of strict scrutiny); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799-800 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that the use of composite scores and race to determine admissions to the Boston Latin
School was an act of racial balancing that violated the Constitution, but recognizing
that, in some instances, diversity could justify using race-based policies). All these
cases accepted the compelling nature of diversity. Hunter and Brewer explicitly found a
compelling interest, while Wessman and Tuttle assumed, without deciding, that
diversity constitutes a compelling interest.
79.
See discussion infra note 424.
80.
See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(relying on Grutter to find a compelling interest in promoting diversity by upholding
the constitutionality of a voluntary plan adopted to combat demographic changes in the
housing market); Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a magnet school's use of racial classifications designed to achieve a racial
balance because it amounted to an impermissible quota under Grutter); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1192-93 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006) (holding that a race-conscious
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reflected a perplexing array of organized legal chaos, which
ultimately compelled the Supreme Court to step in to decide the fate
of diversity in K-12 education in the post-Grutter era of affirmative
action.
C. Everyone's Chasing Brown-PICS and the Illusory
Promise of a Resolution
The Supreme Court announced in June 2006 that it would
consolidate PICS and McFarland for review.81 For the first time
since Grutter and Gratz,8 2 the Court considered the constitutionality
of affirmative action.
This time, however, the case concerned
elementary and secondary public education. Publicity and contention
surrounded the case, and the country waited anxiously for a clear
statement from the Court.8 3 As the Justices lingered, the debate over
race-based preferences augmented. 8 4 By the time-seven months
after hearing oral arguments-that the Court rendered a decision,
the case was the oldest on the docket.85 Unfortunately, the length of
time that the Court considered the case appears inversely
proportional to the clarity of the Court's various opinions.8 6 Despite
sharp disagreement on the constitutionality of the schools plans, the
Justices were unanimous in one respect: every single one of them-in
their own minds-faithfully adhered to Brown's spirit.8 7

tiebreaker assignment plan was constitutionally permissible because there is a
compelling interest to achieve diversity in K-12 education); McFarland v. Jefferson
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 855 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd per curian, 416 F.3d
513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. non. Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ.,
547 U.S. 1178 (2006) (finding a compelling interest in maintaining racially integrated
schools in a district that pursued a voluntary plan after judicial supervision ended in
2000).
81.
McFarland,416 F.3d 513, cert. granted sub. non. Meredith, 547 U.S. 1178,
rev'd sub non. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701.
82.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003).
83.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans for
Integration, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at Al (discussing the turmoil in the Court prior
to rendering the decision).
84.
Id.
Id.
85.
86.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion; Justices Kennedy and
Thomas each filed concurring opinions; and Justices Stevens and Breyer filed
dissenting opinions. ParentsIntvolved, 551 U.S. at 708.
87.
Justice Roberts invokes the Equal Protection Clause's protection of persons,
not groups, as a fundamental principle "going back to Brown itself." See id. at 743
(plurality opinion). Justice Thomas points to Brown's invocation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 749 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens argues that a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny obscures

Brown's clear message. See id. 800-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Roberts, began by
affirming the strict scrutiny standard of review traditionally applied
to racial classifications."
The opinion then proceeded to recite the
two accepted compelling interests for racial categorizations in the
school context: remedying the effects of past discrimination and
Grutter's higher education diversity.89 As to the former interest, the
plurality wrote that, because the plans were voluntary (Seattle was
never subject to a desegregation judicial decree and Louisville
achieved unitary status in 2000), there was no compelling interest to
use race in K-12 student assignments."o As to the latter interest, the
opinion correctly noted Grutter's compelling interest applies only to
institutions of higher education.9 1 The plurality skipped the question
of whether some new compelling interest might exist and proceeded
to examine the plans' failure to use narrowly tailored means to
achieve their goals."2 Invoking Brown's spirit to strike down the
student assignment plans, the plurality averred that "[t]he way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race."93
The main dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer,
austerely accused the plurality of distorting and misapplying
established constitutional precedent, creating rules that obfuscate
state and local governments confronted by growing resegregation of
public schools, and undermining Brown's spirit. 94 The dissent also
accused the plurality of playing a game of semantics by labeling the
interest sought by the districts as an interest in racial balancing.9 5
Instead, the dissent referred to the interest as the elimination of
racial isolation from public schools.9 6 The dissent concluded that the
assignment plans met both prongs of strict scrutiny9 7 and "pass[ed]
even the strictest tailoring test."98

88.
Parents Invohed, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion). The Court's
reaffirmation of the standard of review specifically contradicted Judge Kozinski's
concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision, where he opined that the
Seattle plan warranted an evaluation under a "robust and realistic rational basis
review." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194
(9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
89.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 722 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 720-21.
90.
91.
Id. at 722.
92.
Id. at 723-35.
93.
Id. at 748.
94.
Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95.
Id. at 838.
Id.
96.
97.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 846.
98.
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Although the dissent warned that PICS is "a decision that the
Court and the Nation will come to regret,"9 9 Justice Kennedy's
concurrence brings the prospect of hope. Prior to the decision, it was
easy to conceive that Grutter stood on precarious ground. After all,
Justice Kennedy joined the dissent in Grutter,1 00 and Justice Alito, an
opponent of affirmative action, 101 replaced Justice O'Connor in 2006.

99.
Id. at 868.
100.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003).
101.
In Taxman u. Board of Education of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en bane), Circuit Judge-now Associate Justice Alito joined the majority
in rejecting a diversity rationale to rule against a school board's decision to lay off a
white teacher instead of an equally qualified black teacher. It is far-fetched, on the sole
basis of Taxman, to peg Justice Alito as an anti-affirmative action jurist. That
characterization would be grossly unfair. Although Alito rejected the diversity
rationale in Taxman, the facts of that case were overwhelmingly tilted against the
school district's race-conscious employment policy, which used race as the decisive
factor despite the lack of evidence of a prior constitutional violation that warranted
remedial measures. See id. at 1550-51. Both the district and circuit court rulings
rejected the type of discrimination examined under Taxman. Even a number of
dissenters on the en banc panel acknowledged the merits of certain parts of the
majority opinion. See id. at 1576 (Scirica, J., dissenting) ("While I find much with
which I agree in the majority's opinion, I am constrained to express my disagreement
because I believe education presents unique concerns."); see also id. at 1579 (McKee, J.,
dissenting) ("I can understand the majority's concern over allowing race to be a factor
in any decision."). But compare Judge Sloviter's opinion,
In the law, as in other professions, it is often how the question is framed that
determines the answer that is received. . . . I do not see this appeal as raising a
broad legal referendum on affirmative action . . . . The posture in which the

legal issue in this case is presented is so stripped of extraneous factors that it
could well serve as the question for a law school moot court.
Id. at 1567 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Alito's involvement as Assistant Solicitor General in three cases prior to his tenure
as a jurist may reveal further insights into his views on affirmative action. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (No. 84-1999) (arguing that only
the victims of discrimination are eligible for relief under Title XII); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340) ("[E]ven a finding that there had been past
discrimination against some individuals would not support a categorical racial and
ethnic preference such as that contained in the Jackson agreement."); Brief for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656) (arguing that government
preferential policies based on race are not lawful in various contexts).
Furthermore, during his confirmation hearings as Supreme Court nominee,
controversy arose when written memos surfaced in which Alito wrote he was
"particularly proud" of opposing affirmative action programs. Charles Babington, Alito
Distances Himself from 1985 Memos, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at A01. It should be
noted that a correction to Babington's article appeared in The Washington Post
emphasizing that Alito specifically opposed "racial and ethnic quotas," which did not
include all affirmative action plans. Additionally, during Alito's confirmation hearings,
some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee voiced concerns over Alito's
membership in the Concerned Alumni of Princeton (CAP), a group Alito joined as an
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In a surprising move, however, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
plurality and argued that diversity in education is a compelling
interest that warrants the limited use of race. 102 He correctly noted
that the school plans failed to meet the second prong of strict
scrutiny,10 3 but he dismissed the plurality's rigid insistence that
school districts "must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools." 104

undergraduate at Princeton that advocated quotas designed to limit the number of
women and minorities in admissions and opposed affirmative action plans. See, e.g.,
Eyal Press, Alito's CAP Connection, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/alitos-cap-connection (describing CAP's agenda to
include "preventing women and minorities from entering an institution that had long
been a bastion of white male privilege"); Chanakya Sethi, Alito '72 Joined Conservative
Alumni Group, THE DAILY PRINCETONINAN, Nov. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2005/11/18/13876/ (discussing CAP's disapproval of
coeducation and affirmative action at Princeton and Alito's involvement with the
group). However, the extent of Alito's affiliation and specific role at CAP could not be
substantiated because there was no proof to indicate he was a major donor, and a CAP
founding member appeared on the record stating he did not remember Alito playing a
role in the organization. See, e.g., Kathryn Jean Lopez, Don't Rush to Judgment, NAT'L
REVIEW ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2006, http://old.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/qa2006
01111508.asp (interviewing a CAP founding member, William Rusher, on Alito's
involvement); Byron York, Alito: A Last-Gasp Democratic Gambit Fails, NAT'L REVIEW
ONLINE,
Jan.
12,
2006,
http://old/nationalreview.com/york/york200601120909
(describing Alito's confirmation hearing where Democrats could not present proof of
Alito's involvement in CAP).
It is fair to state that viewing individual parts of Alito's record, in context, is not
sufficient to categorize him as anti-affirmative action. Similarly, the fact that a jurist
holds a certain view of preferential policies does not indicate he or she will depart from
principles of stare decisis when performing judicial duties. However, at a bare
minimum, an examination of the totality of Alito's record on positive discrimination
signals that he would likely join a bloc of Justices who oppose benign government
measures in future cases.
102.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
103.
Id. at 787. Kennedy wrote that school districts can use alternative means
to pursue integration "including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race." Id. at
789. The available alternatives to racial balancing are not mere strategies based on
impracticable utopian ideologies. Rather, as the evidence shows, the alternatives are
tangible, easy to adopt, and far less burdensome than the implementation of race-based
discriminatory policies. For example, the U.S. Department of Education has published
an extensive report identifying admissions-oriented, race-neutral approaches. Among
the alternatives listed are assignments based on socioeconomic status, creation of new
skill- development programs, formation of partnerships between low-performing schools
and universities, and assignments based on random lottery systems. U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES

IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/edlite -raceneutralreport2.html.
104.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788. Coincidentally, Justice Kennedy's lone
opinion came out exactly twenty-nine years-to the day-after Justice Powell, the

2010/1

DECOMKTRUCTING TRANsNATIONALISM

1283

Notwithstanding the Court's vacillation regarding diversity and
the decision's blow to Brown, PICS did not overrule Grutter. Nor did
it result in a binding majority opinion foreclosing any future use of
race in K-12 admissions.10 5 There is good reason to believe that if
the Court were to revisit the issue of diversity in a suit brought by
litigants with a slightly different set of facts, a different result might
ensue. 106

previous holder of Justice Kennedy's seat, announced his lone opinion in Bakke. Id.
(decided June 28, 2007); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978)
(decided June 28, 1978).
105.
To the contrary, PICS suggests that there are now five votes in favor of
declaring a compelling interest for racial diversity in K-12 education.
106.
At the time PICS was decided, there were five votes in favor of finding a
compelling governmental interest to integrate pupils in K 12 institutions. However, a
majority to uphold the constitutionality of the assignment plans did not form because
of problems with the tailoring of the school districts' measures. Notably, the
assignment plans were problematic because they relied on a rigid mechanical formula
that was inconsistent with the districts' purported goal. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S.
at 724 (plurality opinion) (indicating that "a school with 50 percent Asian-American
students and 50 percent white students but no African-American, Native -American, or
Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a school with 30 percent AsianAmerican, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white
students would not."); id. at 727-28; id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
A case with a slightly different fact pattern addressing the tailoring concerns
articulated by Justice Kennedy would likely result in a majority asserting a new
compelling governmental interest. The Court's composition today is the same as it was
in 2007, with the exception that Justice Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter in 2009,
and Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens in 2010. Both Justices were nominated to
their lifetime posts by a Democratic President. Although it is too soon to predict
Sotomayor's views, there are early signs in two major recent 5-4 decisions that hint
she will fall into the so-called "liberal" bloc of Justices. See Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down a provision of a federal law that
banned independent expenditures by corporations and unions on behalf of a political
candidate); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010) (prohibiting a district court
from broadcasting the trial relating to Proposition 8, a California ballot initiative that
defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman). Justice Kagan began her
tenure in the Supreme Court a mere two months ago. Because of her previous post as
Solicitor General, she has recused herself from twenty-five of the fifty-one cases on the
current 2010 Supreme Court docket. Robert Barnes, Kagan's Recusals Take Her Out of
Action in Many of the Supreme Court's Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100303890.html.
Accordingly, it may be a short while before her judicial philosophy becomes apparent.
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II. DIVERSITY AND ITS PIVOTAL SIGNIFICANCE

A. Diversity IncreasesRacial Tolerance and
Promotes Citizenship
Exposure to a diverse environment is crucial to ensure
integration in our multi-plural society. Today, corporations and other
organizations realize the value of employees who are adept in dealing
with people from all walks of life. It should follow that children stand
to benefit even more from living in a society that encourages
integration and desegregation.
Due to the efforts of local governments, public schools are an
essential socializing institution charged with the duty to impart
"shared values through which social order and stability are
maintained."1 0 7 Because children spend most of their waking hours
in school, diversity in educational facilities can be critical in
promoting tolerance and principles of mutual respect for all.10 8 The
Supreme Court "has long recognized that education ... is the very
foundation of good citizenship"1 09 but, by the same token, it has never
indicated that education in an institution of higher learning is more
important than elementary education.
To the contrary, diversity and access to a quality education in
earlier years have a potentially greater impact on a person's life

because discrimination in education is a major factor in the incidence
of poverty.110 What children learn early in their academic and social
life transcends public education and affects professional and personal
aspects of their adult lives.'11 Students who experience "a racially
integrated learning environment . . . learn tolerance towards others

from different races, develop relationships across racial lines and
relinquish racial stereotypes."1 12
The tremendous impact and
influence of early education in a person's life supports the proposition

107.
108.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
See Rajagopalan Sampatkumar, Global Citizenship and the Role of Human

Values, in RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION 70, at 77 (Mary Hayden et al. eds.,

2007) (emphasizing the importance of values-based education).
109.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110.
BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION
187-88 (10th ed. 2008).
111.
See Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 77.
112.
McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 (W.D. Ky.
2004), aff'd per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. nom. Meredith
v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006).
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that diversity in the K-12 context could be even more important than
diversity in higher education.
Moreover, children who are exposed to diversity are more likely
to exhibit tolerance toward others: "Under certain conditions,
interaction between students of different races promotes empathy,
understanding, positive racial attitudes, and the disarming of
stereotypes." 1 3 The goal of cultivating positive attitudes toward
others with different upbringings is easier to achieve if it is nurtured
in childhood and adolescence, because the human mind is highly
malleable early in life.114 Diversity in early education is essential to
stop discrimination by preventing prejudice from setting in children's
minds." 5 It is important to distinguish prejudice and discrimination.
Discrimination entails action, whereas prejudice refers to attitudes
harbored against others. Accordingly, prejudiced individuals may or
may not discriminate, but they continue to harbor hostile feelings for
members of other groups."16 Exposing children to diversity creates
positive outcomes, but as the Supreme Court correctly noted,
diversity "cannot [be] accomplish[ed] with only token numbers of
minority students."" 7
B. Diversity and Its Broad Impact
Elementary and secondary education in the United States is
compulsory." 8 As a result, the majority of children in this country
develop under the joint custody of parents and the K-12 public school
system. For most of the population, a public high school education is
perhaps the last opportunity for any meaningful exposure to racial
diversity in their lives." 9 Indeed, where private housing markets
cause segregation in our public schools, it is possible that children
may never get a chance to enjoy the benefits that derive from
diversity.1 20
Learning is not limited to academics. An indispensable portion
of what a human learns occurs through informal interactions with
people of other races, sexes, religions, and backgrounds, because
"[p]eople do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by

113.
114.
115.
116.

Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 77.
See id.
Id.
117.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
118.
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2010, at 23 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010028.pdf.
119.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1176 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177.
120.
See SCHILLER, supra note 110, at 195.
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the likes of themselves." 121 Consequently, given the likelihood of
success in learning racial tolerance in childhood and adolescence and
the vast number of individuals affected by it, public school districts
have a compelling interest in promoting integration and diversity
through a narrowly tailored use of race. 122 Achieving integration in
public schools can prove problematic at first because the invasiveness
of the majority can appear to threaten the distinct culture of the
minority.12 3 However, the benefits that integration, racial diversity,
and multiculturalism bring outweigh this potential setback at the
early stages of integration.
Diversity in K-12 schools is broader in scope than diversity in
universities. Grutter's viewpoint on diversity, for instance, depends
greatly on the "robust exchange of ideas" among students to develop
"critical thinking skills,"124 but the development of critical thinking
skills does not begin in colleges and universities. Although abstract
or substantially robust exchange of ideas is minimal among students
in the K-12 setting-particularly in early grades, children do learn
the basic skills that form the framework for critical thought later in
life.125 The minds of pupils in primary school are not developed
enough to participate in the type of debates and discussions of pupils
in higher education, but they learn to develop respect for human
dignity and interdependence,1 26 which eventually gives them the
tools necessary to articulate a viewpoint.' 2 7
More importantly,
critical thought is not limited to academia. For example, kids who
play sports and engage in extracurricular activities learn critical
social and thinking skills that serve them in life.' 28
Ensuring
diversity in the K-12 system constitutes a compelling governmental
interest because the range of potential impact is even greater than in
higher education.

121.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 n.48 (1978) (citing
William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY,
Sept. 26, 1977, at 9).
122.
See Grutter,539 U.S. at 313-14 (applying the same rationale to institutions
of higher education).
123.
NEVILLE HARRIS, EDUCATION, LAW AND DIVERSITY 362-63 (2007).
124.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 324.
125.
Judith Graham, Brain Development, U. OF ME. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION
PUBLICATIONS (2001), http://umaine.edu/publications/4356e/.
126.
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 177.
127.
Id.
128.
Extracurricular activities are among the factors considered in university
admissions. Extracurricular Activities, C.
BD.,
http://www.collegeboard.com/
student/plan/high-school/113.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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C. Diversity PreparesStudents to Interact in a Global
Society and Increases Academic Achievement
Grutter held that
diversity constitutes a compelling
governmental interest that meets the requirements of strict scrutiny
because it "better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society." 129 The Court firmly stated that the benefits
of diversity "are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."13 0
This reasoning applies more forcefully to K-12 schools because most
high school graduates never attend an institution of higher
learning. 13 '
Furthermore, the diversity rationale points to research as
evidence that "a desegregated educational experience opens
opportunity networks in areas of higher education and
employment."13 2
Integration and cross-racial interaction studies
indicate that "graduates of desegregated high schools are more likely
to live in integrated communities than those who do not, and are
more likely to have cross-race friendships later in life."' 33 Diversity
in education plays an essential role in eradicating poverty, increasing
average testing scores, and increasing academic achievement.134
More importantly, modern societies in this new era of globalization
realize that segregation and discrimination in education are
detrimental to prosperity because nations need more than a small,
educated elite to remain competitive in the global economy.135
Part II of this Article has restrained its discussion to the use of
contemporary research and sociological science to support the concept
of diversity in K-12 institutions. The use of scientific research to

129.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
130.
Id.
131.
Only one out of five Blacks and even fewer Hispanics attend college.
SCHILLER, supra note 110, at 193. In fact, millions of children today do not even
graduate from high school, which makes diversity in the K 12 setting even more
compelling. A staggering 26 percent of Hispanics and 11 percent of Blacks do not
complete secondary instruction. Id.
132.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1175 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 1177 (citing ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY
WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 11 (2002) (cited in Grutter,
539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).
135.
Derek Woodrow, The Impact of Culture in Creating Learning Styles, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 87, 87.
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support case law is highly controversial.13 6 One downside is that
scientific evidence as a rhetorical device lends itself to potential
ideological use by courts.13 7 However, the last half-century indicates
that social science evidence, regardless of how influential it proves to
be on a case-by-case basis, will most likely continue to be important
in race-based government policies.' 3 8 Social science is not perfect, but
"[i]f we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature
before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one."13 9 The
controversy over the use of psychological and sociological research in
the legal arena is likely to dissipate once scientific research becomes
developed enough "to help demonstrate operational needs in areas of
policing and employment as well as to show the benefits of racial
diversity in sectors outside of higher education."140

III. WAIT, THE NEIGHBORS Too?-AN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR
Before embarking on this next Part, it is imperative to outline
the reasons for shining the spotlight of international law upon the
subject matter of this Article. Why is it worth discussing-from an
international perspective-the constitutional framework of diversity
in education under American jurisprudence? After all, the U.S.
educational system is unique and fundamentally different from the
rest of the world. Unlike most nations, where education and national
curricula are highly centralized, the U.S. educational system depends
on local control and decentralization of schools.141
Moreover,
American constitutional law differs starkly from foreign law 42 and

136.
ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW 2-4 (2006).
137.
Id. at 7.
138.
Id. at 111.

139.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
845 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Both Grutter and PICS relied heavily on multiple
sociological studies to support the diversity rationale. See id. at 840-41; Grutter, 539
U.S. at 330; see also Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science of
Justification for the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger,
59 STAN. L. REV. 761, 770-96 (2006) (analyzing data from diversity studies cited in
Grutter and identifying their virtues and flaws).
140.
ANCHETA, supra note 136, at 113.
141.
Tom Oden, The Role of Standards in K-12 International Education, in
RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, supra note 108, at 176, 176. It should be

noted that although there is currently no official national educational system in the
United States, many scholars believe that national curricula and certain basic
expectations across all school districts demonstrate, in practice, a highly normalized
system. Id.
142.
See, e.g., JESSUP, supra note 14, at 58 (contemplating that differences in
social customs and standards around the world prevent jurisprudential uniformity
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their differences tend to exacerbate the divergence of legal analysis
and interpretation.
Although American educational and constitutional systems differ
from other systems around the world, the American struggle with
measures intended to further diversity in education is not unique. 143
To the contrary, the controversy surrounding preferential treatment
of certain groups plagues many nations just as much as it plagues the
United States.1 44 As Jessup would say, diversity in schools is a
universal human problem.1 45 Many countries have struggled with
diversity-in education, employment, and other aspects of
government-and have employed varying methods and policies to
embrace integration. 146 The pursuit of diversity is considerably
complex and bereft of simple solution.
Nevertheless, it is
inconceivable to think that the United States cannot profit from the
experiences-and mistakes-of others in a world that is increasingly
integrated through global economies, trade, and political agreements.
This Part examines efforts to further diversity in the
international community during the last few decades. It begins by
discussing globalization and its effect on diversity and education.
Next, it surveys the current status of international law in American
constitutional jurisprudence and provides the approach and context
necessary to understand the rationale behind using international or
foreign law1 47 to highlight the importance of diversity. Special

among nations); discussion infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text (comparing
foreign jurisprudence to American laws).
143.
See generally Gajendra K. Verma, Diversity and Multicultural Education:
Cross-CuttingIssues and Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at
21, 28 (arguing that diversity and multicultural education confront challenges that
vary in intensity across regions of the world, but nevertheless create a global impact
that transcends political and cultural barriers).
144.

THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL

STUDY 1-2 (2004).
145.
See JESSUP, supra note 14, at 1 (describing the "universality of the human
problems").
146.
See, e.g., SOWELL, supra note 144, at 3-6 (discussing such efforts in India,
the United States, Singapore, New Zealand, and Pakistan).
147.
From a technical standpoint, it is worthwhile to note that sometimes the
terms "international law," "law of nations," "customary international law," and "foreign
law" are not used interchangeably. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102.2 (1987) ("Customary international law
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation."); id. § 111, introd. note.
The term 'law of nations' was used to describe the customary rules and
obligations that regulated conduct between states and certain aspects of state
conduct towards individuals . . . . From the beginning, the law of nations, later
referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law
of the United States.
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emphasis is placed on recent Supreme Court landmark decisions that
suggest two main schools of thought vis-A-vis interpretation of global
law: nationalism and transnationalism.
In addition, this Part
introduces metanationalism, a new approach to the interpretation of
global law. Lastly, this Part discusses the international community's
efforts to tackle the issue of diversity in education. Particular
attention is applied to India, the most populous and culturally diverse
democracy on Earth.148
A. Globalization
A new world phenomenon with far-reaching implications has
emerged.
Like capitalism, socialism, communism, and other
economic and social theories at their respective times, globalization
has become the most recent and momentum-driven political order. 149

Id. § 111; see also John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
303, 311 (2006) (explaining that foreign law-decisions from foreign courts-is
different from international law and "should not be used to cast doubt on the
constitutionality of our own law because it emerged from a structure designed to
generate norms for another nation, not our own"); id. at 312 (explaining that principles
"of international law are a product of a universal consensus either as realized through
customary international law or treaty"). But see, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163 (1895) (explaining that international law includes "not only questions of right
between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations;
but also questions arising under what is usually called private international law, or the
conflict of laws"); David T. Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent Views on the Use of
International and Foreign Lau: Congress and the Executive Versus the Court, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (2007) (giving interchangeable treatment to foreign and
international law). However, for purposes of this Article, the word "international" is
treated as an umbrella term to identify law that comes from outside the United States.
Thus, a discussion from an international perspective will encompass treaties,
international customs, international agreements, and the domestic law of foreign
countries.
148.

Country

Profile:

India,

INDIAN

HIGH

COMM'N,

BOTSWANA,

http://www.highcommissionofindia.org.bw/Ihc/Html/indianprofile.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2010).
149.
Pepi Leistyna, Horton Hears a Who: Lessons fronm the Highlander Folk
School in the Era of Globalization, in GRAPPLING WITH DIVERSITY: READINGS ON CIVIL
RIGHTS PEDAGOGY AND CRITICAL MULTICULTURALISM 57 (Susan Schramm-Pate &

Rhonda B. Jeffries eds., 2008). As a reference to the reader, to whom the title of
Leistyna's paper may not be recognizable, Myles Horton founded the Highlander Folk
School (HFS) in the Appalachian Mountains of Tennessee in 1932. Id. at 59. HFS
instituted an integration and civil rights program in its curriculum and established
integrated classrooms even before the Supreme Court decided Brown. Id. at 65. As a
result of its integration and desegregation policies, HFS became the educational center
of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and early 1960s. At a time when political
controversy and even claims of student indoctrination in communist ideals surrounded
the school, HFS created literacy programs and workshops where renowned civil rights
leaders and influential figures participated. Id. Among the prominent civil rights
activists who visited HFS were Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokeley Carmichael, Rosa
Parks, Septima Clark, Andrew Young, and Fanny Lou Hammer. Id. In her paper,
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Long gone are the days of isolated civilizations and blood-spattered
conquests. Today, thanks to technological advances in information
and communication, humans live in a world that is interconnected
and interdependent like never before.15 0 Over the span of the last
half-century alone, the Earth's population doubled and the global
economy increased sevenfold. 5 1 This new era of global interaction
between sovereign nations, people, and institutions is slowly, but
gradually, reshaping aged social, political, economical, and cultural
structures.15 2
It is widely accepted that globalization, in its contemporary form,
originated in Western civilization. 5 3
After World War II,
globalization became associated with the free-market economy,
international trade, technological innovations, and greater interstate
flow of commodities, money, information, and people. 154 However,
the core cultural and technological prerequisites for globalization did
not appear until the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the dawn of the
information age. 155 Attempts of Western developed countries to
universalize ideas and values (including concepts of capitalism, free
trade, democracy, and human rights) encountered opposition from
countries that viewed globalization as an imposition on non-Western
culture. 5 6 Notwithstanding the enduring opposition from some in

Leistyna links the innovative and revolutionary curricula and pedagogical techniques
at HFS with the recent globalization movement to argue that participatory actionbased research-the notion of doing research with others rather than on them-can
propel global justice and help globalization simultaneously. Id. at 69-71.
150.
Fazal Rizvi et al., Equality and the Politics of Globalization in Education,
in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 3, 4.

151.

Jasleen Kewlani, Directive Principles of State Policies v. Contemporary

Development: A Socio-Legal Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 370,

371 (2008).
152.
Leistyna, supra note 149, at 57.
153.
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 72.
Id.
154.
155.
Nada Dabbagh & Angela D. Benson, Technology, Globalization, and
Distance Education: Pedagogical Models and Constructs, in RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, supra note 108, at 188, 190.

156.
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 72. Interestingly enough, the same
cannot be said of Western civilizations, which have eagerly embraced non-Western
religions, medicine, art, literature, music, and cuisine. As a result of globalization, the
availability of alternative and "exotic" choices has been fully accepted, admired, and
revered in mainstream Western culture. Id. For instance, it is common for Westerners,
many of whom lead hectic lives and have demanding schedules, to turn to meditation
and yoga imported from Eastern civilizations to cope with stress. Martial arts with
Eastern origins are extremely popular in America and other Western societies.
Western Christians and celebrities often turn to Eastern religions, such as Islam,
Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, or Kabbalism, in their quest to find spiritual
guidance. Mainstream Western musicians evince a strong influence of African,
Eastern, and Latino music in their work. Acupuncture is widely recognized as an
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non-Western societies, several decades of adjustments to cultural and
social practices across various regions of the world have led nonWestern countries to more or less accept-and in some cases
embrace-globalization. 15 7
In its broader sense, the term "globalization" encompasses a
myriad of definitions.1 58 Indeed, the widely used term may denote
slightly different meanings according to the context in which it is
used. However, a consensus has formed that globalization is a
multidimensional phenomenon that is gradually integrating our
world socially, politically, economically, and culturally.15 9 Thanks to
globalization and its effects, no nation can afford to be isolated from
the rest of the world.160 To the contrary, globalization has chipped
away at old-rooted notions of sovereignty, territory, and political
supremacy.16 1 Although the contemporary state continues to play an
authoritative role in society, the need to negotiate and interact with

alternative treatment for certain conditions. These and many more examples of crosscultural enrichment are possible because of globalization.
157.
Id.
158.
Definitions for the term "globalization" are numerous and vary according to
the milieu upon which the concept is discussed. The following is a nonexhaustive list of
definitions for "globalization." Globalization, in the economic context, "refers to the
reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order to facilitate the
flow of goods, capital, services and labour." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm'n for W. Asia
[ESCWA], Annual Review of Developments in Globalization and Regional Integration
in the Countries of the ESCWA Region, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/GRID/2002/2 (Dec.
10, 2002). It is the "inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to
a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations
and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster and deeper." KAMBHAMPATI
S. SASTRY, CONSTITUTION FOR 21ST CENTURY INDIA 150 (2004) (footnote omitted). It is
an emerging and imminent reality based on "the increasing interdependence of human
and nonhuman systems across the planet." WILLIAM GAUDELLI, WORLD CLASS:
TEACHING AND LEARNING IN GLOBAL TIMES 157 (2003) (citation omitted). "[A]n
overarching international system shaping the domestic politics and foreign relations of
virtually every country. . . ." THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 7 (2000). Globalization is the "widening, intensifying,
speeding up and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness." Nada Dabbagh &
Angela D. Benson, supra note 155, at 190. From a purist perspective, "true
globalization is characterized by the elimination of nation-states and the erasing of
national borders." Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 71. Globalization comes "from the
abolition of borders for all kinds of economic, financial and cultural activities. It affects
not only the economic and financial sphere but also national cultures and services . . . ."
Francoise Caillods, The Changing Role of the State: New Competencies for Planners,
INT'L INST. FOR EDUC. PLAN. NEWSL. (U.N. Educ., Sci., & Cultural Org.), Apr.-June
2003, at 1. Globalization refers "to the diminution or elimination of state-enforced
restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex
global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result." Tom G.
Palmer, Globalization is Grrrreat!,1 CATO'S LETTER 1 (2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/
letters/palmer-catoletters.pdf.
159.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
160.
SASTRY, supra note 158, at 150.
161.
Rizvi, supra note 150, at 4-5.
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transnational
networks,
international
organizations,
and
intergovernmental regimes has fragmented the state's political and
economic prowess.162 Whether the world likes it or not, globalization
is omnipresent, inevitable, and unstoppable.1 63 Pretending that
globalization does not exist, or that it can be subdued, is akin to
professing that the world is flat, the sun will not rise, or death is
reversible.
1.

Two Sides of the Coin

The rapid expansion of globalization across the world is a doubleedged sword, which provides opportunity for advancement on one side
and poses challenges that exacerbate inequalities on the other.
Advocates of globalization are quick to point out the benefits of free
trade and world interconnection, which include, inter alia, openness,
accountability, spread of democracy and the rule of law, elimination
of child labor, the creation of wealth, and incentives for conflict
resolution among nation-states. 164 When countries have open access
to large markets, globalization leads to greater efficiency, more direct
investment,
healthy
competition,
higher
quality
outputs,
technological progress, and better standards of living.16 5 Indeed,
foreign direct investment-one of the central pillars of economic
globalization-has helped to integrate many developing countries into
the global economy over the last few decades.166 Undoubtedly,
globalization has a positive impact on societies around the world. 6 7
Sufficient empirical evidence demonstrates the benefits of
globalization, but not all advocates of the global movement confine
themselves to statistical data to advance their point of view: some
advocates claim that free trade is a fundamental and inalienable
human right that forms the basis for every human civilization.168

162.
Id. at 5.
163.
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 73.
164.
See Palmer, supra note 158, at 5-6 (outlining the benefits of reducing
protectionism and increasing globalization).
165.
ESCWA, supra note 158, at 1.
166.
Id. at 2.
167.
Free trade and open markets can play a major role in the worldwide
reduction of poverty. See generally SECRETARIAT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE &
DEV.,
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2004, at
106, U.N.
Doc.
UNCTAD/LDC/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.27 (2004) (providing a discussion of the
effects of globalization in developing countries and the relationship between
international trade and poverty among least-developed countries in the global arena).
168.
See Palmer, supra note 158, at 6 (arguing that globalization is based on the
idea that free trade is not merely a privilege, but rather a fundamental human right
recognized as the foundation of every human civilization since the dawn of time). Tom
Palmer, a Senior Fellow at Cato Institute and Director of Cato University, further
argues that anti-globalization measures are immoral and uncivilized. Id.
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Despite its benefits, globalization is not without shortcomings.
Open markets designed to increase the flow of goods and services can
create dangerously large trade deficits in high-import nations.16 9
Globalization limits local fiscal autonomy to use taxation as a revenue
source because it hinders capital investment. 170
Constant
technological advances generally lead to inequalities between the
rich, whose discretionary income permits access to the new
technology, and the poor in both developed and less-developed
nations.1 71
Economic liberalization policies expose nations and
individuals to more intense market pressures, which can lead to
economic instability. 172
Globalization also makes developing
countries vulnerable to fluctuations in banking and monetary
policies, 7 3 as well as foreign governance and management of their
economic systems. 174
In the global economy, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other transnational financial
institutions exert power and influence over all the governments with
which they interact.s75
Criticism of globalization varies. At one end of the spectrum,
anti-globalists denounce globalization as a ploy multinational
corporations use to increase profits at the cost of individual
freedoms.' 7 6 Under this view, conglomerates with little regard for
religious, cultural, and social sensitivities infiltrate foreign political
and economical systems.' 77 With maximum capital accumulation as
the main goal, corporations exploit and manipulate labor, natural
indigenous populations, and the environment.1 7 8
resources,
Conversely, critics at the other end of the spectrum condemn
globalization for what they perceive to be its harmful effects on
national self-determination and sovereignty. 7 9 According to this
view, globalization interferes with efforts to preserve Western
civilization and diminishes the power and military superiority of the
West. 8 0 Thus, these critics argue that the global system should

169.

ESCWA, supra note 158, at 1.

170.
171.

Id.
MARIA A. PACINO, REFLECTIONS ON EQUITY, DIVERSITY, AND SCHOOLING 44

(2008). Although inequities between rich and poor are visible in developed countries,
generally speaking, the poorer populations of developed nations have greater access to
technological advances. See id.
172.
Rizvi, supra note 150, at 6.
173.
ESCWA, supra note 158, at 1.
174.
SASTRY, supra note 158, at 150.
175.
Id.
176.
Sampatkumar, supra note 108, at 73.
177.
Id.
178.
GAUDELLI, supra note 158, at 157 (citation omitted).
179.
Id. at 158.
180.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 311-12 (1996).
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include mechanisms that promote the spread of Western interests
across the globe. 18 '
Despite the good, the bad, and the ugly that comes with
globalization, one thing is certain: globalization is both incipient and
ubiquitous.
More importantly for this discussion, globalization
implicates educational policy just as much as economic policy.
2.

Education and Diversity

Increasing cross-cultural interaction in our globalized world is
affecting demographics in a way never before seen. As a result of
globalization, immigration to, and diversification of, oncehomogeneous societies is occurring with astounding speed. 8 2 The
cultural diversity of virtually all modern societies is rapidly replacing
societal homogeneity.8 3 Consequently, globalization is a vehicle for
the creation and transformation of multicultural nation-states. 184
Thanks to the global economy, developing countries are now able
to compete and cooperate with developed nations in education and the
job market. 8 5 The exchange between developed and developing
nations has a symbiotic effect. The developed world profits from the
deregulation and low-wage opportunities offered by less developed
countries. 186
In turn, developed nations provide employment
opportunities to foreign individuals with the necessary technological
expertise.18 7
This exchange, however, is only possible if the
developing country's labor force is adequately educated in a
particular field.
The current global economy features a knowledge-based
foundation that requires greater levels of education and training.18 8
Social and economic development is virtually impossible without
educational policies that ensure access, equality, and participation for
all.' 8 9 Formal governmental and transnational policies to deal with
issues of diversity and global population in the educational context

181.
SASTRY, supra note 158, at 151.
182.
This is precisely the case in Europe, Canada, the United States, and other
developed countries that are becoming increasingly diverse with people from different
cultures, languages, and religions. PACINO, supra note 171, at 15.
183.
S. CASTLES & A. DAVIDSON, CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION: GLOBALIZATION
AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 127 (2000).
184.
Audrey Osler, Looking to the Future: Democracy, Diversity and Citizenship
Education, in TEACHERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY: EDUCATING CITIZENS IN
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 3, 3 (Audrey Osler ed., 2005).

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

PACINO, supra note 171, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Rizvi, supra note 150, at 3.
Id.
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are common among nations all over the world,190 mainly because
rapid and constant fluctuations in technology and demographics
provide incentives to improve and renovate an educational system.1 91
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance
of diversity in education within a globalized world.1 92 As noted in the
previous Part, exposure to diversity in education prepares students to
interact in an interconnected world where geographical and ethnic
boundaries are constantly being blurred. 93 Education on a diverse
and multicultural platform can be useful to confront stereotypes,
prejudices,
and ethnocentric
propensities
in
groups
and
individuals.1 94 All pupils must be granted the opportunity to learn
regardless of ethnic, social, and cultural identity, but, at the same
time, they must learn to respect diversity in a multiracial and
multicultural world. 9 5 Global economic integration can be successful
only with a multi-skilled, innovative, and flexible labor force capable
of functioning in culturally diverse environments.19 6 Governments,
transnational organizations, and nongovernmental organizations are
cognizant that universal access to education, especially in
information and communication technology, is the only effective way
to meet the challenges posed by globalization.19 7 Hence, investment
in multicultural education and curricula in recent years aims to
nurture diversity and promote cohesion to improve social relations
between students. 9 8

190.
See GAUDELLI, supra note 158, at 18 (discussing the results of a study
suggesting that elementary students can "'simultaneously develop positive global and
national attitudes' when they engage in dialogue in an open climate" (citation
omitted)).
191.
PACINO, supra note 171, at 25.
192.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (concluding that diversity
in educational facilities is important because "the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints").
193.
Id.
194.
Verma, supra note 143, at 21.
195.
See generally GR. BRIT. DEPT. OF EDUC. AND SCI., EDUCATION FOR ALL:
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO EDUCATION OF CHILDREN FROM ETHNIC

MINORITY GROUPS 363-64 (1985). This government-sponsored report, more commonly
known as the Swann Report, advocated a system of multicultural education for all
learning institutions in Great Britain without regard to race, age range, ethnicity, or
geographical location. Id. The report published data that correlated ethnicity and
educational achievement and discovered that racism had a negative impact on the
education of children from minority groups. Id.
196.
Rizvi, supra note 150, at 7-8.
197.
Id. at 3.
198.
E.g., U.N. EDUC., SC. & CULTURAL ORG., WORLD REPORT EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: INVESTING IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE 15-17,

28-9, 31, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images /0018/001847/184755e.pdf.
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Unmistakably, globalization has an enormous impact on policies
designed to grapple with diversity in education. A more connected
world calls for more connected educational policies that emphasize
pluralism among nations. However, this view implies, at least on a
basic level, that nations also view law and policy in a globalized
context, which is seldom the case.199 For this reason, it is important
to examine the relevance of globalization within our constitutional
framework to American and international law.
B. Square Pegs and Round Holes? InternationalLaw
in American ConstitutionalJurisprudence
The globalization phenomenon is starting to exert a new kind of
pressure upon our legal system. In recent decades, the world has
witnessed an internationalization of legal affairs and institutions. In
the United States, a growing body of foreign and international public
and private law presents a dilemma for the judiciary. 200
International law "is no longer confined in relevance to a few treaties
and business agreements. Rather, it has taken on the character of
transnational law."20 1 Many academics and policy makers believe
that the integration of domestic and international law is a foregone
conclusion that will make it impossible to classify issues as local or
global.20 2
Whether domestic and foreign law will become
unrecognizable in the future is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, prior to an examination of diversity in education from
an international perspective, it is necessary to discuss the role that
international law plays in the American legal system and its place in
evolving constitutional jurisprudence.
1.

The New Archenemies: Nationalism Versus Transnationalism

The dichotomy between international and American law has
permeated the American legal system since the beginning, as shown
by the text of the Declaration of Independence.
The Founding

199.
With the exception of few areas such as the globalization of trade and
technological advances, most sovereign nations are extremely reluctant to relinquish
authority and jurisdiction to international organizations or tribunals. NICHOLAS A.
ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT

535 (1996).
200.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote
Address at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 350.
201.
Id.
202.
Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 305,
306 (2001) (arguing that domestic and global law have melded together, thereby
preventing classification).
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Fathers attempted to create an independent sovereign nation with a
new system of governance and laws. 203 At the same time, the
Framers also understood that the legitimacy of the United States
would be measured by the "opinions of mankind" 204 and the ability of
the country to avail itself of the same powers and duties that other
independent nations enjoyed worldwide. 205 As the United States
developed its own jurisprudence, international law became
incorporated into domestic law, at least where a treaty or action by
one of the branches of government did not forestall it.206 However,
the extent to which international law applies in American
constitutional interpretation remains unclear. In the most recent
iteration of this debate, two distinct theories of constitutional
interpretation vis-A-vis international law emerged: nationalism and
transnationalism. 0 7
Nationalism is a theory "characterized by commitments to
territoriality, national politics, deference to executive power, and
resistance to comity or international law as meaningful constraints
on national prerogative." 208
This theory of constitutional
interpretation dates back to the nineteenth century 209 and has lost

203.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[W]henever
any form of government becomes destructive ... it is the right of the people to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers ... to effect their safety and happiness.").
204.
Id. para. 1 ("When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with
another ... a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation." (emphasis added)). The term
"opinions of mankind" suggests a reference to international law-the worldwide
opinions of nations. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("Wheaton places
among the principal sources of international law 'Text-writers of authority showing
what is the approved usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual
conduct, with the definitions and modifications introduced by general consent."'
(quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

§ 18

(8th ed. 1866)).

205.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 1776) ("[A]s free and
independent states, [the colonies] have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent
states may of right do."); see also Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Partof our
Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 n.3 (2004) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of
State, to M. Genet, French Minister (June 5, 1793)) (noting that Thomas Jefferson, as
Secretary of State, believed that the law of nations constituted an important element of
the laws of the land).
206.
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 ("International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts. . . . [W]here there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or juricial [sic] decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of evilized [sic] nations.").
207.
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1513 (2003).
208.
Id.
209.
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
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some of its momentum in recent years. 2 10 In essence, nationalist
jurisprudence disapproves of surrendering American sovereignty to
the international regime.2 11
Transnationalism, on the other hand, "looks forward toward
political and economic interdependence and outward toward rules of
international law and comity as necessary means to coordinate
international system interests and to promote the development of a
well-functioning international judicial system."2 12 Transnationalism
has been part of American jurisprudence-at least in concept-since
the early days of our republic. 2 13
For a while, both nationalism and transnationalism remained at
the periphery of constitutional debate.
Modern trends of
globalization, however, have made it impossible to ignore them. As
the debate over American constitutional interpretation of

No one, we presume,

supposes that

any change in public opinion or

feeling . . . in the civilized nations of Europe . . . should induce the court to

give . . . the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. . . . [The
Constitution] must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its
adoption . . . as long as it continues to exist in its present form.
Id.

210.
See infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text. The most ardent supporters
of a nationalist approach to constitutional jurisprudence in today's Supreme Court are
Justices Scalia and Thomas. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court
may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.");
Koh, supra note 207, at 1513.
211.
See Koh, supra note 207, at 1490 (discussing "whether and when the
enforcement of international treaties against the United States affronts U.S.
sovereignty").
212.
Id. at 1514.
213.
During the early years of the United States, Justices John Jay and John
Marshall championed a transnationalist approach to judicial interpretation. See id. at
1513 ("The ... venerable strand of 'transnationalist jurisprudence' began with John
Jay and John Marshall. . . ."); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
474 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.) ("[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the
nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of nations."). The approach continued
to garner support from other jurists. For example, supporters of transnational views
include Justice Gray (early twentieth century); Justices Douglas and White (midtwentieth century); Justice Blackmun (1980s and early 1990s); and Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg (1990s until present time). Koh, supra note 207, at 1513; see also, e.g., Harry
A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994)
(expressing that he, now retired from the Court, "look[s] forward to the day when the
majority of the Supreme Court will inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the
time with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind").
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international law intensified during the last decade, the Supreme
Court began to favor, for the time being, the transnationalist view. 2 14
In Atkins v. Virginia,2 15 for instance, the transnationalist view
prevailed when the majority held that the death penalty for mentally
challenged individuals should be condemned in America, just as it
had been within the world community. 216 A year later, in 2003,
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in Grutter that praised
the majority for its reasoning and cited to international human rights
documents.2 17 A more definitive victory for the transnationalist
approach came three days later, when the Court decided Lawrence v.
Texas. 218
In Lawrence, the majority struck down an antisodomy law as
unconstitutional.2 1 9 In the process, it noted that the right to engage
in intimate homosexual conduct "ha[d] been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries." 220 To support its
holding, the majority cited decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, which pointed to an international consensus indicating that
intrusion by the government upon a person's right to choose a sexual
partner-male or female-cannot withstand any judicial scrutiny.22 1
Two years later the Court decided Roper v. Simmons, and the
transnationalist approach prevailed once more.22 2 The majority in

214.
The debate is not constricted to the opinion of the judiciary. In fact,
Congress has also considered the issue in recent years and rejected the concept of strict
nationalism. Attempts to prohibit the use of international legal materials failed under
a Congress with a Republican majority, which is generally perceived to reject a
transnationalist approach. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th
Cong. § 201 (2005); S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005) ("In interpreting and applying the
Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any
constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial
decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international organization or
agency."). Representative Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) and Senator Richard Shelby (RAla.) introduced mirror images of the bill in the House and Senate on February 11 and
February 12, respectively, of 2004, and again on March 3, 2005. The bills were referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary, but failed to garner enough support. See H.R. 1070;
S. 520; Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004); S.
2082, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004).
215.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
216.
Id. at 316 n.21.
217.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("The Court's observation that race-conscious programs must have a logical end point,
accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
218.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
219.
Id. at 579.
220.
Id. at 577.
221.
Id. at 573-76 (citing Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v.
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1981)).
222.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Roper held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments proscribe
the death penalty for minors who commit capital crimes.22 3
Crucially, the Court found "confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty." 224 In the majority's
view, citing the treatment other nations afford certain fundamental
rights "does not lessen [] fidelity to the Constitution or [] pride in its
origins."22 5 Although Roper embraced the use of international law to
interpret certain parts of our Constitution, it explicitly warned that
"[tlhe opinion of the world community, [does] not control[] [the]
outcome."226

Despite the recent legal victories for transnationalism, it can
hardly be said that this area of the law is settled. A trend toward
transnationalism is clearly visible in recent jurisprudence, but
nationalists have strong arguments against the use of international
law to interpret domestic law.22 7 In addition, two of the four most
recent additions to the Court support a nationalist approach, making
it increasingly possible that the ground gained by supporters of
transnationalism will be lost. 228
Justice Scalia's caustic dissent in Roper and other writings
showcase three arguments in support of the nationalist view.2 29
First, nationalists argue that the uniqueness of America's culture and
legal system renders international law incongruous with the
Constitution. 230 Many explicit constitutional provisions-right to

223.
Id. at 560.
224.
Id. at 575.
225.
Id. at 578.
226.
Id.
227.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
228.
The four most recent additions to the Court are Chief Justice Roberts
(2005) and Justices Alito (2006), Sotomayor (2009), and Kagan (2010). Justices Roberts
and Alito have expressed a preference for a nationalist approach to international law.
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice ofthe United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before S. Comm. On the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 200-01 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) ( "In foreign law
you can find anything you want.... Looking at foreign law for support is like looking
out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them. They're there.");
Harold Hongju Koh, Ihiy TransnationalLaw Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745,
749-50 (2006) ("Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
seem[] committed to a more nationalist course.").
229.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230.
See Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court & Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Debate on Foreign Law at American University,
Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate
Transcript]
(statement
of
Justice
Antonin
Scalia),
available
at
http://www.freerepublic.com /focus/news/1352357/posts ("We don't have the same moral
and legal framework as the rest of the world, and never have.... [T]he framers of the
Constitution . . . didn't have a whole lot of respect for many of the rules in European

countries.").
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trial by jury and grand jury indictment-as well as many
interpretations-in evidence, capital punishment, the Establishment
Clause, and abortion jurisprudence-are "distinctively American."23 1
The U.S. "belief that all power has to flow from the people" can be
difficult to understand in foreign nations where liberty flows from a
central power. 232 Second, nationalists contend that the use of
international law inevitably results in subjective selectivity.23 3
Cherry picking the best and most desirable argument from a basket
of international materials "invites manipulation." 234 Under this
reasoning, a jurist may, for example, follow the international
community's lead in some cases and choose to ignore it in others. 235
Third, most nationalists believe that strict adherence to the text of
the Constitution is the only legitimate approach to constitutional
theory.23 6 Departure from the Constitution's text "would abrogate
the [] character of [the judiciary], and make it the mere reflex of the
popular opinion or passion of the day." 237 Under a nationalist view,
international law should be considered only during legislative and
constitutional drafting. 238
Therefore, under the nationalist
viewpoint, the Founding Fathers appropriately looked to the law of
nations, but a jurist today would be wrong to do so. 239

231.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 623-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232.
Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Stephen Breyer).
233.
See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 ("To invoke alien law when it agrees with
one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but
sophistry." (footnote omitted)).
234.
Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Antonin Scalia).
235.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 625-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Scalia-Breyer
Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of moderator, Norman Dorsen, Founder
and President, U.S. Ass'n of Constitutional Law) (noting the Court's lack of citations to
East Asian, South American, and Islamic law).
236.
See Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Antonin Scalia) ("[A]s an originalist, I would look at the text of the
Constitution.... That's the end of the [search] for me. What good would reading
[foreign] opinions do, unless it was my job to be the moral arbiter, which I don't regard
it as?").
237.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
238.
Koh, supra note 205, at 54 (citation omitted).
239.
See Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Antonin Scalia) ("[I]n writing [a constitution], of course you consult foreign sources, see
how it's worked, see what they've done, use their examples and so forth. But that has
nothing to do with interpreting it."). But see Koh, supra note 205, at 54 (arguing that to
interpret the U.S. Constitution by looking at the drafters-but not the interpreters-of
other constitutions around the world would be as preposterous as "to operat[e] a
building by examining the blueprints of others on which it was modeled, while ignoring
all subsequent progress reports on how well those other buildings actually functioned
over time").

2010/

DECOmATRUCTING TRANNATIONALISM

1303

C. Metanationalism
Given the effects of globalization on diversity and education and
the recent trend in American jurisprudence toward a more
transnational approach to constitutional interpretation, it is now
appropriate to set the context for the discussion that follows. The
purpose of this section is not to argue on behalf of a particular theory
of constitutional interpretation vis-A-vis international law or even to
endorse alternative conjectures. 240 Instead, the goal is to highlight
what our neighbor societies are doing to confront a global problem.
Regardless of whether the need to follow or cite international law
exists-as nationalists and transnationalists debate, 24 1 there is real
value in awareness of the successes and failures from experiments
taking place in "laboratories" around the world. 242
Critics might claim that the suggested approach is a mere
watered-down version of the transnationalist view, but they would be
mistaken. There are fundamental weaknesses in transnationalism
that vitiate its persuasiveness. One of the strongest arguments

240.
For instance, Justice O'Connor sponsored a modified version of
transnationalism during her tenure on the Court. She believed that "conclusions
reached by other countries and by the international community should at times
constitute persuasive authority in American courts," and that there is much we can
learn from foreign jurists. O'Connor, supra note 200, at 350. However, she also believed
that international law should not be given a confirmatory role in interpreting American
laws unless "the existence of an international consensus ... confirm[s] the
reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus." Roper, 543 U.S. at
605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's dissent in Roper suggests that if there had
been a national consensus among the states against the death penalty for minors at the
time, she would have assigned a confirmatory role to the international consensus and
thereby treated it as persuasive authority worthy of citation. Applying the same
reasoning, O'Connor's approach would, for instance, result in the adoption of a federal
right to an education because of the presence of both a national-forty-eight states
explicitly recognize education as a right in their constitutions-and international
consensus. See generally Angela Avis Holland, Note, Resolving the Dissonance of
Rodriguez and the Right to Education: International Human Rights Instruments as a
Source of Repose for the United States, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 229 (2008)
(advocating for the adoption of international law and legal commitments embodied in
international treaties when there is an international consensus to support them).
241.
See Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Stephen Breyer) (arguing that citation to international sources is appropriate as a form
of intellectual honesty); id. (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) (elaborating that
citation to international materials grants them improper precedential value).
242.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." (emphasis added)).
The same rationale can be applied in the international context. The United States can,
without social or economical risk to itself, observe the experiments of other nations
and, thereafter, decide whether or not a similar or different approach could benefit the
nation.
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transnationalists make, for example, suggests that selectivity serves
a purpose; namely, that the practices and societal standards of other
mature societies-as opposed to those that are underdevelopedshould be construed with respect because of their relevance to our
jurisprudence and "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 243 In other words, transnationalists,
as Professor Koh clarifies it, afford a "decent respect" only to the laws
of developed societies and ignore the laws of whatever legal system
they deem to be lagging behind. 244
A standard that requires jurists to look at mature or developed
societies for constitutional guidance elicits legal predicaments
because it requires a subjective definition of "maturity."245
if
maturity means that a jurist must look at societies with longestablished legal systems, why then-as it logically follows-must a
jurist not look at other mature systems that differ greatly from our
own?
Conversely, if maturity is measured by compliance with
Western standards, why would it be appropriate to look to decisions
of constitutional democracies that have been established for a
relatively short period of time, but have not attained complete and
thorough development? 246

243.
Koh, supra note 205, at 56 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
244.
Id.
245.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term "mature" as (1) fully-grown
or developed; (2) carefully or thoroughly planned; or (3) timely or ripe. Mature,
COMPACT

OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY,

http://www.askoxford.com:80/concise-oed/

mature?view=uk (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). Merriam-1Webster Dictionary defines
"mature" as (1) "having completed natural growth and development"; (2) "having
attained a final or desired state"; (3) "having achieved a low but stable growth rate"; or
(4) having older or elderly characteristics. Mature, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mature (last visited Oct. 15,
2010).
246.
In recent times, many legal scholars have noted that the constitutional
courts in India, South Africa, and Canada are becoming increasingly influential. Adam
Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al;
cf. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003)
(noting that India's high court has developed extensive jurisprudence on affirmative
action). Transnationalists would willingly consider decisions from South Africa's
Constitutional Court because it was modeled, to a great extent, under the American
Bill of Rights-including subsequent rights interpreted under the American
Constitution-and, thus, exhibits the core characteristics of a mature society. See S.
AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 7-39 (enumerating the rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the South
African Constitution, which include the rights to life, liberty, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, property, eminent domain, freedom of assembly, petition, access to
courts, due process, fair trial, access to counsel, equal protection under the law,
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, privacy, adequate conditions of
detention, protection against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, remain silent, not
be subjected to slavery and forced labor, be informed of the cause and nature of
detention, vote, and travel). However, the Court has only been in place since 1996.
While South Africa's Constitutional Court has made impressive developments in
human rights and other areas, one can hardly call it "mature."
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The argument Professor Koh and other transnationalists make is
counterintuitive because we can learn just as much from the mistakes
of others as from their successes without trying to subjectively
measure jurisprudential maturity. 247
As Justice Scalia has
articulated, "societies don't always mature.
Sometimes they
rot.... [H]uman progress is [not always] one upwardly inclined
plane."24 8 Even advanced civilizations, with a strong record of
respect for human rights and civil liberties, experience setbacks. For
a recent example of a setback in a mature society, we must look no
further than the recent ban of minarets approved overwhelmingly by
Swiss voters. 249
Flaws in transnationalism are not limited to buzzworthy terms
like "maturity." Koh's theory of transnationalism is also selfcontradictory. Koh explains that advocates of transnationalism are
not "international majoritarians who believe that American
constitutional liberties should be determined by a worldwide vote";
instead, they assert that the Constitution should be construed with
respect for mature legal systems. 250 Without a doubt, Professor Koh
is one of the most respected, influential, and articulate
transnationalists. But his opinion implies that he has either carved a
new subset of transnationalism or turned a blind eye at the reasoning
of the transnationalists that he frequently cites. 251
In reality, transnationalists themselves do not commit to
opposing international majoritarianism, contrary to Koh's assertion.
If they were committed to doing so, there would be no need to
haphazardly mention that the United States is the only country in
the entire galaxy that dissents from the wise opinions of the rest of

247.
See supra text accompanying note 246 (noting Koh's suggestion that
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution can be illuminated by the practices of mature
foreign legal systems); see also infra text accompanying note 260.
248.
Scalia-Breyer Debate Transcript, supra note 230 (statement of Justice
Antonin Scalia).
249.
On November 2009, 57 percent of voters in twenty-two out of twenty-six
cantons in Switzerland supported a referendum proposal to amend the Swiss
Constitution to prohibit the construction of a distinctive architectural feature of
Muslim mosques called minarets. Voters feared that Muslim ideology would lead to
Islamization, despite the fact that only 400,000 Muslims reside in Switzerland and only
four minarets have been built. Swiss Voters Back Ban on Minarets, BBC NEWS, Nov.
29, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8385069.stm.
250.
Koh, supra note 205, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
251.
Koh has often applauded the transnationalist views of Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Kennedy, and O'Connor in recent years. E.g., Koh, supra note 205, at 48; see
also id. at 50-51 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Kennedy, J.)) (adding
an exclamation point to convey importance to the fact that the European Court of
Human Rights struck down homosexual sodomy laws that affected 800 million people
in forty-five member countries of the developed Council of Europe); id. at 49 (citing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
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humankind,2 52 whenever the international community forms a
consensus contrary to U.S. law.2 53 Supporters of construing domestic
law to the image of international law are quick to point out the few
instances where the United States chooses not to follow the rest of the
world, as if to implicitly denounce the United States for lagging
behind a number of underdeveloped countries.254
In the field of education, as in other areas, transnationalists who
advocate for U.S. ratification of international and humanitarian
treaties fail to see things from a pragmatical, rather than theoretical,
perspective. The United States may sometimes be the lone objector
in the international community, but that does not mean that mere
ratification of a politically expedient document automatically results
in strict-or even moderate-adherence to the provisions of the
agreement. In fact, supporters of ratification seem oblivious to the
political and economical benefits that developing nations stand to
enjoy by virtue of joining an international agreement. Subscribing to
widely accepted international treaties offers a boost of legitimacy to a
state that oppresses its people and violates their human rights. The
mere appearance of respecting international legal standards, even
without a true commitment to a treaty's objectives, can persuade a
state to sign and ratify.25 5 For proponents of immediate ratification,
it would simply suffice that the United States endorse an
international
agreement-or
subscribe
to an international

252.
See sources cited supra notes 204-05 (referring to the "opinions of
[hu]mankind").
253.
See infra note 254 and accompanying text; see also MARK DAVID AGRAST ET
AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX (2010) (using polling data from

local population and "qualified, expert" respondent questionnaires in the three most
populous cities of thirty-five indexed countries-in the case of the United States, the
cities polled were New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago-to formulate a global ranking
that places the United States outside the top 20 percent of nations in terms of open
access to government, respect for fundamental rights, access to civil justice, absence of
corruption, adequate regulatory enforcement, etc.).
254.
Of course, the transnationalists that Koh cites do not renounce
international majoritarianism, which suggests that Koh is either turning a blind eye to
their writings or advocating a different type of transnationalism that is not fully
subscribed by those transnationalists he cites. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 576 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (noting that the majority of the international community
disagreed with U.S. law at the time of Roper and that "every country in the world has
ratified save for the United States and Somalia," the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child (emphasis added)); see also id. at 577 (highlighting that "only seven countries
other than the [United States] have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
China" (emphasis added)).
255.
Cf. Mike Moore, China's WJTO Deal: A Defining Moment for Global
Cooperation, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
19,
2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
09/19/opinion/19iht-edmoore ed2 .html (discussing the political and economical
benefits China stood to gain by accession to the WTO despite its record of human rights
violations).
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consensus-without previously analyzing or demonstrating whether
the agreement is capable of bringing about the intended change.25 6
Nationalism's outdated and narrow outlook in an increasingly
globalized world and transnationalism's flaws and contradictions
should not restrict the potential benefits of examining international
law in constitutional inquiries. Instead of thinking of nationalism
and transnationalism as two mutually exclusive concepts at opposite
ends of a linear spectrum of constitutional interpretation and
international law, these two concepts should be viewed as important
elements in a multidimensional plane where theories exist to broaden
and enrich legal analysis. For this reason, this Article introduces a
new theory called metanationalism.
Metanationalism rejects the
notion that international sources-whether
originating from
established or emerging societies that share most, or none, of
American cultural values and traditions-are bereft of legal value. 257
Under metanationalism, the debate over citation to international
materials is irrelevant because the focus of metanationalism is not to
look to the decisions of foreign constitutional courts and import them
as persuasive legal authority. Instead, metanationalism advocates
inspection, observation, and analysis of the successes and failures
that other nations experience when they try to implement measures
to mitigate the effects of common problems affecting all societies.
Certain provisions of the Constitution should not be construed with
respect-or deference-for mature international law, 258 as Professor
Koh posits. Rather, the Constitution should be interpreted with
respect for American values enriched by the awareness of
international law.259
Under the metanationalist approach,

256.
For instance, despite ratification of international treaties aiming to secure
free and compulsory education to all children, many ratifying nations do not
demonstrate a full commitment to the provisions of the treaties. See Eric Lerum et al.,
Strengthening America's Foundation: Why Securing the Right to an Education at Home
Is Fundamental to the United States' Efforts to Spread Democracy Abroad, 12 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 13, 13 (2005) (noting that the UN Committee on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights reported that of the nations that ratified the international education
treaties, not a single one submitted a detailed plan outlining how the nation hoped to
improve educational opportunities).
257.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should "reconsider [its rulings] in light of the views of foreigners, or
else it should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions").
258.
See Koh, supra note 205, at 56 ("When phrases like 'due process of law,'
equal protection,' and 'cruel and unusual punishments' are illuminated by parallel
rules, empirical evidence, or community standards found in other mature legal
systems, that evidence should not simply be ignored.").
259.
Cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Either America's
principles are its own, or they follow the world; one cannot have it both ways."). Justice
Scalia fails to recognize that it is plausible to interpret the U.S. Constitution from a
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international law can be used to inform the law, rather than to
construe the law.
Metanationalism does not require the United States to surrender
its legal sovereignty to foreign jurists. For example, a jurist may
discover that other nations have not tried a solution to a particular
problem, but she may find, through research of international sources,
instances where policies and legal constructs have gone awry.
Examining other nations' mistakes can inform and enrich the jurist's
perspective to assist her own legal reasoning. The United States may
not have the same moral and legal framework as other nations, but
that has not prevented this country from learning from others, as the
Founding Fathers did best. When determining policy, the United
States does not look only to the practices of other mature democracies.
America has learned valuable lessons from across the globe.2 60
Jurists should emulate this reasoning in a way that is consistent with
American constitutional principles.
In essence, metanationalism adapts transnationalist principles
with special consideration for nationalism. International law under
metanationalism has a similar role to that of a linesman in soccer. 261
Decisions by the linesman are advisory and never binding on the
referee. A linesman merely informs, clarifies, and draws attention to

national perspective with a healthy awareness of international norms, without
following or surrendering autonomy to the rest of the world.
260.
See, e.g., The European Experience with Cap and Trade: Testimony Before
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Ben Lieberman,
Senior Policy Analyst for Energy and Env't, Thomas A. Roe Inst. for Econ. Policy
Studies), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/Energyand
Environment/
tst07l009a.cfm#_ftn3 (providing information about Europe's strange experience with
cap and trade measures to reduce greenhouse gases to combat global warming). See
generally GEORGE CRILE, CHARLIE WILSON'S WAR: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE
LARGEST COVERT OPERATION IN HISTORY (2003) (narrating the story of the CIA's secret

war in Afghanistan during the late 1980s, and how U.S. funding of the only successful
jihad in recent history, and subsequent neglect in post-war times, caused Afghanistan
to fall into the hands of the Taliban and other rogue groups); GRZEGORZ W. KOLODKO,
TEN YEARS OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION LESSONS FOR POLICY REFORM (1999)

(outlining lessons for developing policy reorientation in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union after economic policies of the so-called Washington consensus failed to
introduce post-socialist nations to the world market economy); Robin Hindery, UCSF
Faculty Get Insiders' Look at Cuban Healthcare System, UCSF TODAY (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://today.ucsf.edu/stories/ucsf-faculty-get-insiders-look-at-cuban-health-care-system/
(discussing a visit to Cuba by a group of faculty members at the University of
California, San Francisco Medical School to observe the healthcare system; the system
provides free healthcare for all, nourishes a thriving biotech industry, and attracts
students from dozens of countries despite poverty and the U.S. economic embargo of
the last half century).
261.
Metaphors relating jurisprudence and sports are common in the United
States. See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Umpires i. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at WK1
("Judges are like umpires.... They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a
limited role." (quoting Chief Justice Roberts)).
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incidents occurring at the periphery of the referee's sight.26 2 The
linesman's perspective benefits the game and enriches the referee's
decision making in key areas of the field. Nevertheless, the referee
remains the only authoritative figure with the power to settle
controversial matters. 263
Admittedly, the nature of American constitutional jurisprudence
is unique. Nationalists are right to characterize an attempt to
construe domestic law according to international standards as an
attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole. For instance, the threetiered model of judicial scrutiny applied to equal protection cases is
distinctively American. 264 This means that it is nearly impossible to
find cases where other nations have deemed diversity in education to
be a compelling governmental interest that justifies the narrowly
tailored use of race or ethnicity in benign discrimination. In the field
of comparative law, Europe's principles of proportionality and
necessity might be the closest relatives to our three-tiered scheme,
but these principles are very distant cousins of American equal
protection jurisprudence.26 5 Consequently, the most logical way to
observe whether a nation treats diversity in education as a
compelling interest is to examine and analyze the level of importance
that foreign governments and constitutions afford to diversity
measures. 266 This approach fits smoothly within the contours of

262.
Press Release, Union of European Football Ass'ns, UEFA Europa League to
Provide Testing Ground for IFAB Additional Assistant Referees Experiment (Aug. 28,
2009), http://www.uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/pressrelease/uefa/uefamedia/87/
94/10/879410_download.pdf.
263.
Id.
264.
See, e.g., Aaron Baker, Proportional,Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S.
"Suspect Classifications"Model Under Article 14 ECHR in the U.K., 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
847, 868 (2008) (noting the uniqueness of American equal protection jurisprudence).
265.
See SASTRY, supra note 158, at 78-79 (recognizing that principles of
proportionality and necessity prevent the European Union from taking action-unless
it is more efficacious-at national, regional, or local levels of governance that goes
beyond the required steps to achieve the goals of the treaty that created the Union).
266.
To illustrate this point, consider societies that exhibit a willingness to place
education among the highest goals to be pursued on their national agenda (e.g.,
European Union, South Africa, Canada, India). Increases in government funding of
education, groundbreaking legislation, judicial intervention, or a combination thereof
are some methods societies use to increase diversity in education. See, e.g., S. AFR.
CONST., 1996 § 29 (right to a basic education); Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, c.23, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (right to receive primary and secondary school instruction);
EUROPEAN COMM'N EURYDICE EUROPEAN UNIT, HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN
EUROPE: POLICIES, STRUCTURES, FUNDING AND ACADEMIC STAFF 17 (2008),

http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic reports/091EN.pdf;
discussion infra Part III.D.4. India has applied all these methods in recent years to
grant fundamental right status to education under the veil of constitutional reforms.
See discussion infra Part III.D. The United States does not currently recognize a
fundamental right to education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
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metanationalism because the goal is not to mimic international
norms, but to observe and learn how other countries promote
diversity.
With this frame of reference in mind, this Article
demonstrates that India-the most populous, diverse, and pluralistic
nation on Earth-is an exemplary case study of diversity and
constitutional jurisprudence.
D. India
India holds a particularly important place in this Article's
discussion of diversity, education, and the international community.
After a period of economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
India has become one the world's fastest growing nations in terms of
economic development.26 7 India, a democratic nation, is the second

U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that education is neither an explicit nor implicit right under
the Constitution that warrants the Court's departure from tradition against creation of
"substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws"). But cf. id. at 100-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (attacking the majority for
willfully ignoring the creation of substantive rights to vote in state elections, procreate,
appeal criminal convictions, have an abortion, enjoy privacy, etc.).
Rodriguez hampered the progress of Brown and laid the groundwork for the
subsequent resegregation of school districts. See Jeffery S. Sutton, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez and its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008)
(discussing the case and its effects on educational reform). Although Rodriguez has
survived for over three decades and education is an area mostly left to the discretion of
states, there is a recent shift toward a more uniform, quasi-federal system of education.
This is evidenced by the federal enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of
2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). NCLB's primary objectives are to provide equal
opportunity and access to a quality education, close the achievement gap between highand low-performing children across all socioeconomic levels, and hold state and local
governments accountable for improving academic achievement for all students. Id. To
retain its status as the world's superpower, the United States must ensure that it
continues to lead world innovation, which is impossible without an adequately
educated citizenry and an emphasis on math and sciences. See, e.g., id. at § 6311(b)(3)
(aiming to make math and science integral parts of children's curricula). Though NCLB
is in its infancy and its implementation has proven controversial, there is clear
overwhelming bipartisan support for the Act. Stephen E. Spaulding, Legislating
Beyond an Educated Guess: The Growing Consensus Toward a Right to Education, 28
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 539, 556 (2008) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY
THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007)). Hence, NCLB's strong bipartisan support
suggests the genesis of a federal right to education.
Of course, whether education should constitute a fundamental right is beyond the
scope of this Article. Elevating education to the highest constitutional rank would
certainly promote equal access and qualitatively fungible educational facilities across
the United States, and these improvements are an important piece of the diversity
puzzle. However, this Article argues that part of the reason other nations have adopted
the right is because they see it as the means to the ultimate goal-promoting diversity.
See discussion infra Part III.D.
267.
Econ. Research Serv., India, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/India/.
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most populous country in the world.268 In fact, projected population
estimates indicate that the population of India will grow at a faster
pace than that of China, and by the year 2050, India will become the
most populous country in the world. 269
India is a complex plural society like no other. It is the world's
most ethnically diverse and socially fragmented state. 270 No other
state matches the unique cultural, linguistic, and genetic diversity of
India; scholars believe that the diversity of India is exceeded only by
the entire African continent.27 1 India's population can be divided into
three ethnic categories: Indo-Aryan (72 percent of the population),
Dravidian (25 percent of the population), and Mongoloid and other (3
percent of the population). 272 These three main categories can be
further dissected into subgroups along religious, linguistic, regional,
and caste lines.273
Hindi, the official and most commonly spoken language in the
nation, is spoken by less than one-third of Indians. 274 The Indian
government estimates that there are 850 languages and over 1,600
dialects spoken in daily life. 275 A staggering twenty-two languages
are constitutionally recognized for educational and political
purposes.2 76
The same patterns of diversity dominate religion,
although there is a clear religious majority: nearly 80 percent of the
population is Hindu, while only 13.4 percent is Muslim, 2.3 percent is
Christian, 1.9 percent is Sikh, and less than 1 percent is Buddhist. 277

268.
The latest Census of India reports that as of March 2001, the population in
India was 1,028,737,436 persons, of which 532,223,090 are male and 496,514,346 are
female. See Population of India, OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM'R,

http://www.censusindia.gov.in/CensusData_2001/India-at-glance/popul.aspx.
Currently, India makes up nearly 17 percent of the world population. The United
Nations estimates that as of 2009, India's actual population was 1,198,003,000 persons
while China's population was 1,345,751,000 persons. POPULATION DIV., DEP'T OF ECON.
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE
2008 REVISION tbl. A.1 (2008), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/

wpp2008/wpp2008 text-tables.pdf.
269.
By the year 2025, the populations of India and China will nearly mirror
each other, but by 2050 India's population is projected to be 1,613,800,000 persons,

which is approximately 200 million more than the 1,417,045,000 persons estimated to
inhabit China. POPULATION DIV., supra note 268, tbl. A.2.
270.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 23.
271.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FED. RESEARCH DIV., COUNTRY PROFILE: INDIA 7
(2004).
272.
Id.
273.
Id.
274.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 23.
275.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 271, at 7.

276.
These languages include: Assamese, Bengali, Bodo, Dogri, Gujarati, Hindi,
Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Maithali, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya,
Punjabi, Sanskrit, Santhali, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. Id.
277.

Another 0.6 percent of the population belongs to other unspecified faiths,

which include religions associated with the Scheduled Tribes. Id. at 8.
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Although caste divisions have been abolished in the Indian
Constitution, the caste system remains a pervasive feature in daily
life, especially in rural areas.2 78 This is particularly true for the
Scheduled Castes (SC), or Dalits, 279 a group that ranks below the four
major categories within the caste system. 280 Another group, which
also ranks below the caste system and is composed of members from
any of 461 recognized indigenous tribes, is called the Scheduled
Tribes (ST).28 1
Dalits and the Scheduled Tribes constitute
approximately 16 percent and 8 percent of the total population
respectively. 282 These two groups are among the most neglected,
poverty-ridden, and economically deprived people in India. 283
1.

Constitutional Framework

Modern Indian constitutional law dates back nearly sixty years.
In 1947, British rule came to an end and India gained its
independence. 284 British authorities helped the Indian people to
create a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. 285 After the
adoption of its Constitution, India became a democratic republic in
1950.286
As is evident from the document itself, the framing of the new
government was a daunting task. India's Constitution is the most

278.
Christopher R. Bagley, Dalit Children in India: Challenges for Education
and Inclusiveness, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 181, 181.
279.
Several terms such as "untouchables" or "Scheduled Castes" are used
interchangeably to identify this group of people. "Scheduled Castes" is a legal term
used more formally, while "untouchables" was used often in the past. Today, the
preferred term this group uses for itself is "Dalits," which roughly translates to
downtrodden. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 271, at 7.
280.
The four major categories of the caste system are (1) Priests and Scholars,
(2) Soldiers and Leaders, (3) Craftsmen, and (4) General Workers. See Bagley, supra
note 278, at 181.
281.
The term "Scheduled Tribes" is often used formally in legal matters in the
same manner as Scheduled Castes. However, a more commonly used term for the
Scheduled Tribes is "adivasi." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 271, at 7.
282.
The latest Census of India reports that as of March 2001, the SC population
in India was 166,635,700 and the ST population was 84,326,240. See CENSUS OF INDIA
2001,
SCHEDULED
CASTES
AND
SCHEDULED
TRIBES
POPULATION
(2001),
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census Data_2001/Census data finder/ASeries/SCST.htm.
283.
See infra notes 382-404 and accompanying text (discussing the Dalits'
hardships).
284.
Vijayashri Sripati & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, India: Constitutional
Amendment Making the Right to Education a FundamentalRight, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L.
148, 149 (2004).
285.
C. Raj Kumar, International Human Rights Perspectives on the
Fundamental Right to Education: Integration of Human Rights and Human
Deielopment in the Indian Constitution, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 262 (2004).
286.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 149.
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extensive and detailed constitution in the world.2 87 It consists of 22
parts containing 395 articles and has been amended-as of 2008-93
times since its inception.2 88 Such detail has contributed to criticism
that the document is too elaborate and filled with trivial
administrative details. 289 However, the attention to detail evinces
the framers' commitment to bring about fundamental changes to
create a social revolution throughout their homeland.2 90
The Preamble establishes the basic structure of the government.
The powers vested in the Constitution originate from the highest
source of authority-the Indian people. 291 The Indian Constitution
follows a federalist model under which the Constitution is superior to
all other laws; the Union and state governments have divided powers;
and the judiciary functions independently from other branches of
government.29 2 Although the Constitution is modeled after federalist
principles, there are clear distinctions between the Indian federation
and the federal model of the U.S. Constitution. 293 The most notable
distinctions are dual citizenship, which does not exist in India; the
power of U.S. states to enact their own constitutions; and the Indian
Union's ability to exercise powers otherwise reserved for the states. 294
The core provisions of the Indian Constitution rest in Parts III
(Fundamental Rights) and IV (Directive Principles of State Policy). 29 5
The chapter on fundamental rights is a near replica of the UN
Declaration on Human Rights, which was enacted in the aftermath of
the Holocaust. 296 Among the fundamental rights enumerated in
India's Constitution are the rights to equality,29 7 freedom,29 8 religious

GOKULESH SHARMA, CONSTITUTIONS OF SAARC NATIONS 949 (2008).
288.
See INDIA CONST. art. 15, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-third
Amendment) Act, 2005; id. art. 395 (the last Article of the Constitution).
289.
GOUKELESH, supra note 287, at 949.
287.

290.

Kumar, supra note 285, at 262-63.

291.
See INDIA CONST. pmbl. (stating the people of India are giving this
Constitution to themselves).
292.
P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 2 (8th ed. 2007).
293.
Id.
294.
Id.
295.
Kumar, supra note 285, at 263.
296.
Madan Mohan Jha, The Right to Education:Developing the Common School
System in India, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 125, 125. On
December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed a Universal Declaration on
Human Rights that included "the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom of
movement, nationality, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of
peaceful association and assembly, and freedom to take part in the government." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
297.
See INDIA CONST. arts. 14-18. The right to equality encompasses equal
protection of laws, equal opportunity, and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds
of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Id.
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autonomy;2 9 9 cultural and educational rights;300 constitutional
remedies;o30 and the right against exploitation.30 2
The chapter on directive principles, which includes Articles 36 to
51, aims to establish and promote social welfare in the Union.3 03 The
Directive Principles are a unique feature of India's constitutional
structure 304 and emphasize the framers' commitment to the
advancement of social, economic, and cultural rights.30 5 However,
under Article 37, the provisions of the Directive Principles are
judicially unenforceable. 306
Unlike
the
justiciable
and
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights recognized in Part III
and under international human rights law, the directive principles
merely propose social reforms 307
Although the Indian Supreme Court has refused to place the
Directive Principles in equal stature with the Fundamental Rights, it
has construed Parts III and IV of the Constitution consistently with
one another.30 8 During its short tenure, the Court has far exceeded
the role envisioned by the framers and has become a self-appointed
guardian of individual liberties and an enemy of political
aggression.30 9
Its decisions reflect a broad interpretation of
fundamental rights, with supplementation from the directive

298.
See id. arts. 19-22. The freedoms protected include freedom of speech,
assembly, and travel; a right against self-incrimination; a right to counsel; and freedom
from deprivation of life and personal liberty. Id.
299.
See id. arts. 25-28. Freedom of religion under these Articles includes
freedom of religious conscience and exercise, and the establishment of secular
instruction in educational institutions maintained by the state. Id.
300.
See id. arts. 29-30. The cultural and educational rights target educational
institutions in order to protect minorities' right to establish and administer their own
schools and be free of discrimination in them. Id.
301.
See id. art. 32. Individuals have the right to move the Supreme Court to
enforce these rights. Id.
302.
See id. arts. 23-24. Exploitation includes human traffic, slavery, and child
labor. Id.
303.
Kewlani, supra note 151, at 371.
304.
Subhash C. Kashyap, The Constitution of India and InternationalLaw, in
INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (Bimal N. Patel ed., 2005).
305.
Kumar, supra note 285, at 264.
306.
INDIA CONST. art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part [IV] shall not
be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to
apply these principles in making laws.").
307.
But cf. Kashyap, supra note 304, at 16 (arguing that the directives were
meant to be treated as positive mandates included in Part III of the Constitution and
not mere moral precepts).
308.
See e.g., Kumar, supra note 285, at 270 (construing the right to education
in Part IV in terms of the right to life and personal liberty in Part III).
309.
Id. at 266. Kumar draws an analogy between India's Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court in its early years by arguing that India's Court has bestowed
upon itself a role similar to that exhibited in Marbury u. Madison. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle of judicial review).
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principles to achieve a welfare state.3 10 As the Court has stated,
"[t]he directive principles cannot ignore or override the fundamental
rights but must . . . subserve [them]." 31 1 In essence, the directives in

Part IV are subsidiary to the rights found in Part III of the
Constitution. 3 12
Having explored India's constitutional framework, the next
section analyzes the application of constitutional norms to issues of
diversity, minorities, education, and the state.
2.

Diversity, Minorities, and State Preferential Treatment Policies

The framers of India's Constitution envisioned India as an
egalitarian society.3 13 As a result, the Indian Constitution provides
ample protections to minority groups in social, political, and
economical spheres. 3 14 The framers were conscious of the importance
of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice for all to create a successful
democracy that could withstand the pressures of time.3 15
Considering the framers' familiarity with the issues faced by other
modern democracies, it is no coincidence that the Constitution
included special provisions for minorities.3 16
India's highest court shares the framers' sentiment regarding
disadvantaged groups, and it has asserted that "pluralism is the
keynote of Indian culture and religious tolerance."31 7 The rationale
behind Parts III and IV of the Constitution is to "make the quality of
the life of the poor, disadvantaged and disabled citizens of the society,
meaningful."3 18
The framers and subsequent members of the
government branches in India tried to eradicate poverty and build an
egalitarian socialist democracy.31 9 However, it is not possible, by

310.
Kashyap, supra note 304, at 17.
311.
In re Kerala Educ. Bill, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956, 982-83 (India).
312.
Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226, 228.
313.
Mohammad Shabbir, Constitutional JurisprudenceAffirms Reservation for
Indian Backward Muslims: Advocacy for the Motion, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 151, at 3, 3.
314.
ARUN KUMAR, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES
UNDER INDIAN CONSTITUTION 234 (1985).
315.
Id. at 9.

316.
Id.
317.
Valsamma Paul v. Cochin Univ., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1011, para. 25.
318.
Id. para. 6.
319.
See, e.g., INDIA CONST. arts. 21, 43, 45 (providing for the protection of life
and personal liberty, living wages for workers, and free and compulsory education for
workers); Valsamma Paul, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. para. 6 (discussing making protections of
quality of the life of the poor meaningful); SARBANI SEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS 104-05 (2007) (discussing
the debate regarding the treatment of minorities during which many members argued
for protection based on "backwardness" rather than minority designations); Shabbir,
supra note 313, at 3 (stating that the framers envisioned an egalitarian society).
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mere adoption of doctrines and principles in a constitution, to quickly
eliminate age-old inequalities.3 2 0
During the Constituent Assembly, the question of how to ensure
equal civil and political rights in line with the Constitution
emerged. 3 21 During the debates, the use of positive discrimination to
benefit certain segments of the population became a major source of
controversy.3 22 Opponents of enacting policies distinguishing Indians
along cultural lines argued that such distinctions would harm the
Union.323 As resistance to positive discrimination increased, some
did not want the Constitution to even mention backward classes and
argued that the directive principles already provided that every man,
woman, and child should be literate within ten years of the
enactment of the Constitution. 324
In the midst of pervasive political contention, one man-Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar-made it his mission to advocate for the inclusion of
positive discrimination measures to benefit disadvantaged groups.32 5
He argued that the rights of people are not protected by law, but
rather by a social and moral sense of right and wrong.32 6 Through
discourse and speeches at the Constituent Assembly debates, he
quickly became one of the most influential characters of the
Assembly.3 27
Dr. Ambedkar and those in favor of state affirmative measures
were ultimately successful. 328 The pro-affirmative action coalition
reasoned that only social reconstruction would ensure the success of

320.
Shabbir, supra note 313, at 3.
321.
SEN, supra, note 319, at 103.
322.
See id. at 103-08 (describing debates contrasting concerns for fair
involvement with encouraging state unity and discouraging a sense of otherness). The
terms "affirmative action," "positive discrimination," "preferential treatment," and
"government reservations" are used interchangeably to describe programs instituted by
the government to advance or benefit minority groups with little or no representation
in society. See, e.g., id. at 108-09 (using "affirmative action," "positive discrimination,"
and "special treatment" interchangeably, all in the same brief discussion).
323.
Id. at 104-05. One Assembly member summarized a popular sentiment
when he exclaimed "it has been our desire and it has been the very soul of the birth of
our freedom and our resurgence that we must go towards unity inspite of all the
diversity that has divided us." Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
324.
Id. at 105.
325.
See id. at 103-04 (describing Ambedkar's contention that the Assembly did
not represent a united political community, claiming it effectively excluded minorities).
Ambedkar was a Dalit and civil rights pioneer who, upon obtaining his degree from
Columbia University, returned to India to initiate a movement towards Dalit
emancipation. Bagley, supra note 278, at 182.
326.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 190. For his work to advance Dalit rights,
Ambedkar is called the Indian equivalent of Martin Luther King, Jr. Id.
327.
Kumar, supra note 285, at 267.
328.
See id. at 267-68 (discussing the inclusion of Article 32 providing for
judicial enforcement of the fundamental rights).
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political democracy.3 29
In their view, state intervention was
necessary to redistribute wealth and entitlements because certain
classes of people had developed serious disabilities or handicaps,
which could only be addressed if the Constitution authorized positive
discrimination.33 0
At its core, the issue of preferential treatment for minorities
became a matter of bringing equilibrium to the Union.3 3' In a system
of adult franchise, majorities need little or no institutional protection
because they can impose their will through elected representatives.3 3 2
However, to ensure equality for all in a democracy, it is imperative
that minorities are able to avail themselves of constitutional
protections. As a result, India's Constitution affords special rights to
the socially deprived and disadvantaged.33 3
When the framers drafted the Constitution, Ambedkar's imprint
was clearly visible. The drafting committee produced a formula that
guaranteed equality and opportunity to the members of historically
deprived groups. 334 To improve the socioeconomic standing of the SC
and ST, the Constitution made provisions for positive discrimination
in educational institutions, representation in Parliament, and
employment. 335 In addition, the Constitution provided for successive
five-year plans to review the development of policies ranging from
building a scientific and technological infrastructure to improving
conditions of the poor and raising industrial capacity.33 6
Interestingly, affirmative measures to benefit the underprivileged
classes concentrated on education.3 37 This focus laid the groundwork
for a constitutional amendment aimed at eradicating social
segregation through the advancement of educational opportunities, as
discussed in the next subpart.

329.
SEN, supra note 319, at 108.
330.
Id. at 108-09.
331.
KUMAR, supra note 314, at 9.
332.
Id. at 9-10.
333.
Id.
334.
SEN, supra note 319, at 110.
335.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 24.
336.
SHARMA, supra note 287, at 952.
337.
See, e.g., SEN, supra note 319, at 109 (reiterating that the socially and
economically disadvantaged need special treatment in education to aid the
development of India). Many in the Constituent Assembly believed that "the case of the
[SC] is not pleaded on a matter of communalism . . . [it is] due to their lack of social,

economic and educational advancement for years . . . [that] it is necessary." Id.
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Diversity and the Emergence of a Right to Education

The origin of a right to education dates back more than a
century, when India was still under British rule.33 8 In 1909, the first
attempt to make primary education mandatory reached Indian
legislators by means of a bill under the Indian Council Act of 1909.339
At the time, an overwhelming majority defeated the bill, but this
defeat did not stop G. K. Gokhale, the bill's sponsor, from denouncing
the opposition.34 0 While addressing the legislature, Gokhale foretold
that the issue would persist until all children obtained access to a free
education as a matter of right. 341
In British India, the provinces controlled education. 342 That
control resembled the current practice in the United States, where
education is traditionally left to the control of individual states. 343
This approach to education, however, came under scrutiny at the
Constituent Assembly, where some debated whether control over
education should shift from the states to the Union. 344 By the time of
enactment, the Constitution included a right to free and compulsory
education, but only as a Directive Principle in Part IV. 345 Article 45,
which originated from Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), prescribed that
"[t]he State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years
from the commencement of this Constitution, free and compulsory
education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen
years."346
The inclusion of a right to education was a significant step,
despite its relegation to the Directive Principles. Although the
inclusion of the right to education under the Directive Principles
precluded Indians from invoking the power of Article 32 to remedy a
violation of that right, 347 the courts would still play a major role in
defining the status of education in society.

338.
See Jha, supra note 296, at 126 (describing the first attempt to provide free
and compulsory education in 1909).
339.
Id.
Id.
340.
341.

Id.

342.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 150.
343.
Oden, supra note 141, at 176.
344.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 150.
345.
Jha, supra note 296, at 126.
346.
INDIA CONST. art. 45, amended by The Constitution (Eighty-Sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002; see Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1
S.C.R. 594 (describing ICESCR Article 13 and relating it to Article 45).
347.
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is the gatekeeper of constitutional
remedies. It provides judicial remedies to violations of fundamental rights. INDIA
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Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court of India began to
interpret Article 21, which protects life and personal liberty, in a
broad manner. 348 In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator,
Union Territory of Delhi,349 the Court stated that "[t]he right to life
includes the right to live with human dignity [including] the bare
necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse
forms."3 50 This focus on literacy developed throughout the 1980s and
1990s. 35 1 In 1992 and 1993, the Court rendered judgments in two
landmark cases adjudicating the status of the right to education:
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka35 2 and Unni Krishnan J. P. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh.35 3 Both cases dealt with issues of higher
education but, in the end, the decisions had a greater impact on the
status of primary education. 354
In Unni Krishnan,the Court voiced its discontent over decades of
neglect of Article 45.355 It pointed out that, among all the articles in
the Directive Principles, only Article 45 had a time limit. 356 The
Court reasoned that the government's failure to fulfill its obligation to
provide education, after more than four decades, converted that
obligation into a judicially enforceable right.35 7
The Court
interpreted Article 21 broadly by finding an implicit right to
education flowing from the right to life and personal liberty. 358 Thus,
Articles 21 and 45 of the Constitution had to be read in harmony
because the deprivation of elementary education rendered the right to
life and personal liberty meaningless.3 5 9
Unni Krishnan motivated
civil
society
groups
and
nongovernmental organizations to demand the incorporation of the
right to education under Part III of the Constitution. 360 As a result,

CONST. art. 32 ("The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part [III] is guaranteed.").
348.
Jha, supra note 296, at 126.
349.
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Adm'r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R.
516.
350.
Id. at 518.
351.
See, e.g., Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 S.C.R.
594, 656 (holding that the delay in adhering to Article 45 has made education an
enforceable right).
352.
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658.
353.
Unni Krishnan, 1 S.C.R. at 594.
354.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 152.
355.
Id. at 153.
356.
Unni Krishnan, 1 S.C.R. at 656.
357.
Id.
358.
Id. at 652 ("[W]e hold ... that [the] right to education is implicit in and
flows from the right to life guaranteed by Article 21.").
359.
Jha, supra note 296, at 126.
360.
Id.
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the central government introduced the 83rd Amendment Act in 1997,
which granted fundamental right status to education.36 1 Due to a
change of government, the bill was reintroduced as the 93rd
Amendment Act of 2001.362 The Lok Sabha3 63 passed the bill
unanimously on November 28, 2001.364 Six months later, on May
2002, the Rajya Sabha3 65 also approved the bill.3 66 With the approval
of both houses of the Legislature, the President signed the bill on
December 2002, and it formally became the 86th Amendment to the
Constitution.3 6 7
The Amendment added a new Article 21(A) to the Constitution,
which states that "[t~he State shall provide free and compulsory
education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such
manner as the State may, by law, determine."36 8 Furthermore, it
reworded Article 45 by omitting the time limit and instead requiring
that "[t]he State shall endeavour to provide early childhood care and
education for all children until they complete the age of six years."36 9
At the time, some wondered why it was necessary to pass a
constitutional amendment when the Court had declared the right to
education to be judicially enforceable ten years before.3 70 However,
the constitutional status of the right to education insulates it from
political acts by the Legislature and evinces the government's
compelling treatment of education as a matter of utmost
importance. 37 1
At first glance, education might not seem as important as the
rights to life, freedom, and personal liberty. After all, one may
continue to breathe, say what one thinks, practice any religion of
choice, and be free from government intervention without having
received an education. However, education affords human beings the

361.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 154.
362.
Id.
363.
The Lok Sabha, or the House of People, is the name given to the lower
house of the Indian Parliament. Kumar, supra note 285, at 271 n.226.
364.
Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 156.
365.
The Rajya Sabha is the name given to the upper house of the Indian
Parliament. Id.
366.
Id.
367.
Id.
368.
INDIA CONST. art. 21(A), amended by The Constitution (Eighty-Sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002.
369.
INDIA CONST. art. 45, amended by The Constitution (Eighty-Sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002.
370.
See Prachi Srivastava, Lou-Fee Private Schooling: Challenging an Era of
Education for All and Quality Provision?, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
13, at 138, 140-41 (explaining that "the insistence of including the term 'by law' [in
Article 21(A)] was to mark India's outward compliance in the international politics of
education agenda-usetting").
371.
BAKSHI, supra note 292, at 55.
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opportunity to exercise the other rights.
"Education is
enlightenment. It is the one [right] that lends dignity to a man."3 72 A
person cannot truly be free to pursue happiness if she is unable to
communicate, to learn to think for herself, to make meaningful and
informed choices, to secure a job to provide for her sustenance, and to
escape the evils of social segregation, profound poverty, and
institutionalized ignorance. The right to education plays a crucial
role in support of other fundamental and constitutionally protected
rights.
An examination of the emergence of education as a fundamental
right in India-first through jurisprudence and later by means of a
constitutional mandate-reveals that diversity was a crucial factor in
the development of the right to education. The existing literature has
overlooked the role of diversity, which was a vital element in the
education-rights movement in India. In essence, education achieved
its status as a fundamental right to advance, inter alia, diversity in
India's educational system. The original obligation of Article 45 was
fulfilled for the most affluent members of Indian society, but the most
underprivileged members of Indian society remained unaided.37 3 The
right to education subsequently became a fundamental right because
the government intended to eradicate illiteracy and extend
educational opportunities to the most underprivileged minorities in
the country. 374 By elevating education to the pinnacle of the law, the
Amendment compels the government to provide access and better

372.
Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 706.
373.
See Number of Literates & Literacy Rate, OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN. &
CENSUS COMM'R (2001) http://censusindia.gov.in/CensusData_2001/India-at-glance/
literatesl.aspx (reporting a 58.7 percent literacy rate in rural areas as compared with a
79.9 percent literacy rate in the more wealthy, urban areas).
374.
See Sripati & Thiruvengadam, supra note 284, at 154-56 (discussing the
debate over the efficacy of the constitutional amendment at meeting its goal of
providing quality education). Access to education in mid-twentieth century India was
available only to the most affluent members of society. The total literacy rate in India
in 1951 was a dismal 18.33 percent, with a clear disparity between male and female
literacy rates. Kewlani, supra note 151, at 377. Although the literacy rate has grown
remarkably to 64.84 percent since independence, there is a near 20 percent disparity
between the urban-rural and male-female literacy rates. Number of Literates &
Literacy Rate, supra note 373. This is not surprising given the fact that the majority of
SC and ST live in rural areas. The data provided by the 2001 Census clearly illustrates
two trends. First, rural areas perform dramatically worse than urban areas in
providing access to education. Second, women as a group are more likely to be denied
access to education than men, especially in rural areas. The disparity between male
and female literacy rates could presumably exist because women in India are
traditionally charged with home-related duties like caring for younger siblings,
cooking, and maintaining the home. For an overview of the social and cultural
discrimination young girls face in India, see a collection of essays published in
UNWANTED DAUGHTERS: GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN MODERN INDIA (T.V. Sekher &

Neelambar Hatti eds., 2010).
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funding to education of the underprivileged classes, thereby
guaranteeing the rise of diversity in primary, secondary, and higher
education, as well as the future of the Indian labor force. The policies
aimed at benefiting underprivileged groups exhibit India's
commitment to promote diversity.
4.

Compelling Treatment

Advancing diversity in society has been a daunting task for
India's government.
Despite India's status as the most
demographically diverse and pluralistic country, the caste system and
other institutions of Indian society have strengthened and
perpetuated social segregation. The stratification of Indian society
through the caste system is a fairly recent development.37 5 Caste was
justified as necessary to bring harmony to the social order by
allocating particular tasks to individuals born into certain roles-in
the case of the Dalits, those tasks included digging graves, cleaning
streets, and disposing of animal carcasses and human feces. 376
However, scholars believe that caste was introduced as a scheme
designed to consolidate the power of the elite.3 77 Individuals outside
the four major categories of the caste system were outcasts and
deemed untouchable.3 78 Because of their rank in the caste system,
the Dalits faced severe penalties for violating laws prohibiting any
physical contact with higher castes.3 79 For example, when entering a
Hindu community, Dalits had to beat drums to warn people to keep
their distance.3 80
Due to invidious laws, discrimination against
Dalits and other outcaste groups quickly became institutionalized,
which ultimately lead to profound poverty and segregation.3 8 1
The framers of India's Constitution were well aware of the evils
of de jure discrimination, and they legally abolished untouchability in
Article 17 of Part III of the Constitution.38 2
Despite the legal
dismantling of untouchability, however, discrimination continues to
be a part of everyday life, particularly in rural areas where belonging
to a scheduled caste or tribe remains a social burden.3 83 In rural

375.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 181.
376.
Id. at 181-82.
377.
Id.
378.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 25.
379.
Id.
380.
Id.
381.
See Bagley, supra note 278, at 182-83 (describing current-day Dalit
poverty, segregation, and political situation in the context of Indian history).
382.
See INDIA CONST. art. 17 ("Untouchability is abolished and its practice in
any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability'
shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.").
383.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 27.
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India, Dalits are prohibited from using local water sources due to
claims that they will contaminate the water. 384 Consequently, Dalits
must travel miles just to reach drinkable water.3 85
The list of discriminatory practices is extensive, as a recent
Human Rights Watch report indicates.3 86 India's agrarian economy
is sustained primarily by Dalits, who tend to be landless peasants
working in deplorable conditions for wages of less than one dollar a
day.38 7 More than one million Dalits in India work exclusively by
cleaning feces from public and private latrines and carrying waste to
dumping sites.388 Any Dalit who refuses to perform assigned taskseven without being paid-is likely to receive physical punishment.3 8 9
The slightest attempt to deviate from village traditions, challenge the
social order, or demand political rights or better pay for wages is met
with violence or economic retaliation by upper castes.39 0
These pervasive discriminatory practices affect other areas. For
example, the right to vote is often denied to Dalits.3 9 ' Intimidation
from police and upper caste militia makes it difficult for Dalits to
register to vote,392 and death threats and violent acts are the norm
when Dalits run for political office.3 93 Moreover, although upper
castes consider Dalits untouchable, that has not prevented the rape
and sexual mutilation of countless young Dalit girls and women at
the hands of depraved men from all castes. 394
Additionally,
discrimination in India is not unique to the countryside. Though
most overt discrimination takes place in rural areas, covert
discrimination is common in urban areas, where Dalit colonies still
exist.39 5 The law does not require Dalits to inhabit any particular

384.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 183. For instance, in a case documented on
December 8, 1978, a girl who collected water from a well set aside exclusively for caste
Hindus had her ears severed from her head as punishment. See SOWELL, supra note
144, at 25. Unfortunately, these incidents are not isolated to a particular region and
when they occur, they are often accompanied with escalated violence and other
atrocities. Id. at 25-28.
385.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 183.
386.
13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASTE DISCRIMINATION: A GLOBAL CONCERN 18
(2001), http://www.hrw.org/legacy /reports/200 1/globalcaste/caste080 1.pdf.
387.
Id.
388.
Id. at 13.
389.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 182.
390.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 386, at 19.
391.
Id.
392.
Id.
393.
Id. Upper caste groups often employ intimidation to hinder Dalit
representation in government posts. In 1997, for instance, members of an upper caste
group murdered six Dalits, including the newly elected village council president, in the
village of Melavalavu, located in Tamil Nadu's Madurai District. Id. (citation omitted).
394.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 183.
395.
Id. at 182.
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areas of a city, but their poor socioeconomic standing compels them to
live in segregated zones.39 6
In education, discrimination is no different. Dalit children
enrolled in schools tend to be segregated from the rest of the
population and must eat separately.39 7 They often lack access to
toilets and potable water and quickly become the targets of bullying
and violence.39 8 The prejudice faced by Dalit children is not confined
to classmates: school officials and teachers instill the notion in Dalit
children that they are backward, stupid, and destined to failure.39 9
The constant harassing of Dalit children is a major contributing
factor for the exorbitant dropout rates in India. 400 The National
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Tribes' 1996-1997 and 19971998 Report estimated that the national dropout rate for Dalit
children in India was roughly 50, 68, and 78 percent at the primary,
middle, and secondary levels respectively. 401 If Dalits overcome
obstacles in their search for education and obtain degrees in higher
education, they continue to face heightened societal discrimination. 402
Despite obtaining degrees, educated Dalits have difficulty finding
employment related to their area of expertise or any employment at
all-except for menial tasks, which are always readily available to
Dalits. 403 Many scholars compare the trials of Indian Dalits to the
slavery and segregation that African-Americans experienced in the
United States. 40 4 Similar to many minority groups in the United

396.
Id.
397.
Id. at 185.
398.
Id.
399.
Id. In some cases the consequences of discrimination against Dalit children
go beyond mere mental damage. For instance, a young Dalit boy living in Gujarat was
slapped and threatened with expulsion for playing with his teacher's scooter. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 386, at 17 n.86. After the boy's father, a "manual
scavenger," forcedly signed a letter of apology, the teacher allowed the boy to return to
class. Id. However, the teacher told the boy that he would never let him "study or
amount to anything in life." Id. That evening, the boy's body was found cut into pieces
on a railroad track with a suicide note in his pocket. Id. The note depicted his lack of
hope for ever progressing in life and his belief that the denial of study or progress
rendered life meaningless. Id.
400.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 386, at 16-17.
401.
Id. at 17.
402.
Bagley, supra note 278, at 186.
403.
Id.
404.
Id. at 181-82. The level of discrimination faced by many Dalits could
plausibly be in equal footing with the struggles of Blacks before the American Civil
War and the Reconstruction Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. However, the same
cannot be said about minority groups in America today. Similar to the Dalits, many
minority groups in the United States experience segregation caused by socioeconomic
factors and private housing patterns, but no social or governmental institution in the
United States condones the extent of stratification and discrimination faced by Dalits
in India. The current plight of undocumented foreign nationals in American society can
arguably provide better context because some "illegal aliens" tend to be marginalized
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States, the Dalits are promised protection by a constitution that
guarantees legal rights on paper, but allows segregation and
obstructs integration in practice.
It is no coincidence, given the widespread segregation across
Indian schools, that the government experimented with policies to
increase diversity. Governments around the world realize that access
to universal primary education is the starting point for the
eradication of poverty. 405
The Indian Court held that the
Constitution allows for the reservation of seats and preferences for
members of SC and ST in higher education. 406 However, the
government has placed an even greater emphasis on diversity in
primary education. For instance, starting in the 1960s, India's
Education Commission, also known as the Kothari Commission,
recommended the introduction of the Common School System
(CSS). 407 To eradicate segregation in educational facilities, the CSS
advocated the creation of "neighborhood schools," which all children
would attend regardless of "caste, creed, community, religion,
economic condition, or social status." 408 In 1968, the National Policy
for Education (NPE) adopted the Commission's recommendations
with the goal of implementing the concept of neighborhood schools
within twenty years. 409

from mainstream society and often work in slave-like conditions for low wages.
However, even undocumented foreign nationals in the United States enjoy more
protections and better living standards than Dalits. See e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 230 (1982) (prohibiting a state from denying public education to a discrete and
insular minority group of undocumented children). Nevertheless, the struggles of
Dalits in India help us to better understand the rationale behind the government's
efforts to increase diversity and benefit those for whom equal protection under the law
remains out of reach.
405.
See, e.g., SHENGGEN FAN ET AL., GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY IN
RURAL CHINA: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INVESTMENTS 49 (2002) (reporting that government

expenditure and investment on education in less developed areas of rural China had a
great impact on the reduction of poverty and regional inequality); JANDHYALA B. G.
TILAK, EDUCATION AND ITS RELATION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH, POVERTY, AND INCOME
DISTRIBUTION: PAST EVIDENCE AND FURTHER ANALYSIS (1989) (pointing to global

empirical research and analysis to highlight the role of education in reducing poverty);
A. Mushtaque R. Chowdhury, Equity Gains in Bangladesh Primary Education, 49
INT'L REV. EDUC. 601 (2003) (providing an account of progress made in Bangladesh in
terms of equity levels and trends in primary education); Kumar, supra note 285, at
239, 241 (stressing the necessity of universal primary education as a tool to eradicate
poverty, and noting India's recognition of the importance of education).
406.
See Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 4 S.C.R. 1 (upholding a
law that provides for 27 percent reservation of lower castes in educational institutions
supported by the central government); see also Ajay Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1994) 4
S.C.C. 401 (India) (holding that reservations in medical colleges are constitutionally
permitted).
407.
Jha, supra note 296, at 129.
408.
Id.
409.
Id. at 130.
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By the beginning of the 1980s, the Sixth Five-Year-Plan set out
to combat segregation by focusing on the educational needs of the
most disadvantaged states. 410 The dropout rate was one of the
biggest obstacles in poverty-ridden states with high populations of SC
and ST. 4 11 Consequently, the government introduced measures to
keep children in school, such as offering free meals, uniforms, and
learning materials; providing day care facilities and financial aid to
families of SC and ST girls; changing the school hours to suit local
preferences; and introducing a non-formal system of learning. 412 In
addition, the government introduced regulations that required
disadvantaged states to boost enrollment rates. 4 13
During the late 1980s, the Seventh Five-Year-Plan introduced
teacher education programs, such as Operation Blackboard, with the
objective of improving school facilities and informal instruction. 4 14
The NPE also reviewed the recommendations made by the Education
Commission two decades earlier and shifted the CSS focus to a
national system of education in which all students have access to a
comparable quality of education. 415 By 1990, the government realized
that the implementation of the CSS was inefficient and established a
committee to investigate the system's inefficiency. 416 The committee
reported that elites and affluent members of society preferred to send
their children to private schools, thereby removing incentives to
invest in government schools. 417 In light of this discovery, the
government immediately devised integration plans to work in tandem
with private schools, which began to run afternoon informal
education centers in their facilities. 41 8
The partnership between government and private schools has
proven successful in making education available to children working
and living in urban slums, and many of these children have been
integrated into modern society. 4 19 For example, the Loreto Day
School, a private school affiliated with the government, has been
closely studied for its success in achieving social integration, inclusive
schooling, and equal access to quality education. 420 At Loreto,
regular students tutor street children individually and the school

410.
Kumar, supra note 285, at 243.
411.
Id.
412.
Id.
413.
Id.
414.
Id. at 244.
415.
Jha, supra note 296, at 130.
416.
Id.
417.
Id.
418.
Id. at 131-32.
419.
Id. at 132-34.
420.
Madan Mohan Jha, Barriers to Student Access and Success: Is Inclusive
Education an Answer?, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 33, 40-41.
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runs community outreach programs. 421 Loreto brings poor children
face to face with wealthier children and cultivates the expectation
that all students can succeed regardless of socioeconomic status. 422
India and other developed and developing countries understand
that education for all, equal access, and integration are important
tools in developing vibrant economies. As a result, these countries
treat diversity as a compelling interest that justifies measures to
integrate pupils from different races, castes, religions, and cultures in
educational facilities.423

IV. SOMETHING'S GOTTA GiVE

Today, the law governing diversity in America stands at a
crossroad. On one hand, Grutter's viewpoint diversity is awkwardly
out of place in the K-12 context. 424 On the other hand, if diversity

421.
422.

Id.
Id.

423.
For the reasons articulated at the beginning of this section, the discussion
here has focused on India. However, efforts to promote diversity in education can be
seen all over the world-albeit with various degrees of success. For instance, to
promote diversity and end segregation, most former communist states in Eastern
Europe are reforming their educational systems to help integrate Roma (Gypsy)-the
most marginalized ethnic group in Europe-pupils by building teacher training
establishments, hiring Roma teaching assistants and home-school liaison officers in
areas with high Roma populations, and even offering post-statutory education for
Roma adults. Hilary Gray, Diversity, Inclusion and Education: The EducationalNeeds
of Children from Seiverely Disadvantaged Socio-Cultural Groups in Europe, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 104, 110. Similarly, to address the
underachievement of the Roma population, the European Union has established its
only support fund dedicated to a single ethnicity to benefit Roma pupils. Id. at 105. To
further diversity, Taiwan and South Korea recently overhauled their university
admissions systems to shift focus away from test scores in favor of more holistic review
that includes unique talents, essays, and extracurricular activities. Jha, supra note
420, at 37-38. To address segregation and promote diversity, in racial and religious
sectarianism contexts, Northern Ireland instituted the Bill of Rights in Schools (BIOS)
project, which focused on citizenship education of five key human rights concepts:
equality, freedom, justice, respect, and participation. Jackie Reilly et al., Educationfor
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, in TEACHERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY,
supra note 184, at 53, 56. In China, the communist regime instituted diversity-related
policies in the 1990s whereby ethnic minorities can be exempt from the one-child
restrictions and granted preferential treatment in admission to higher education.
SOWELL, supra note 144, at 9.
424.
A reliance on Grutter's jurisprudence to justify the use of race-based
admissions policies in the K-12 context is misguided. Grutter explicitly applies to
higher education because the use of racial tiebreakers in an open-choice,
noncompetitive elementary and secondary public school assignment plan is sharply
different than the use of race as a factor in admission to an elite institution of higher
education. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1992) ("[A] state
university system is quite different in very relevant respects from primary and
secondary schools."). First, universities are distinguishable from K 12 schools in that
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does not constitute a compelling governmental interest that justifies
measures to achieve integration and quality education in K-12
schools, the crisis of segregated schools will only exacerbate.
Private housing patterns in America's socioeconomic landscape
depict a gloomy future in the battle against segregation. 425 Judicial
intervention is needed, now more than ever, to delineate the
constitutional boundaries of voluntary race-based assignment plans
designed to eradicate segregated districts.
Society must take
proactive steps to deal with racial isolation, regardless of whether it
is the result of de jure or de facto segregation. This Part proposes a
new approach to equal protection jurisprudence that reconciles Parts
I, II, and III in light of recent changes to Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and the role of international law in our system.
A. Grutter Upholds, but Changes the Nature of, Strict Scrutiny
The concept of strict scrutiny can be traced back to Korematsu v.
United States.426 The case involved the constitutionality of a military

they foster an environment for "robust exchange of ideas" that derives from "expansive
freedoms of speech and thought." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 359 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
The educational autonomy universities enjoy is based on First Amendment principles.
Id. "It is the business of a university to provide [an] atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 263 (1957). In contrast, most K 12 institutions are highly standardized and
operate to provide a basic education. Second, universities, unlike K 12 public schools,
maintain an exclusionary admissions system in which competition plays a crucial role.
The K 12 system does not allow for holistic review of an applicant-a key factor in the
survival of the law school's affirmative action plan in Grutter. Grutter,539 U.S. at 337.
Third, Grutter's narrow ruling is clear: the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grutter
to determine "[w]hether diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the
narrowly tailored use of race . . . for admission to public universities." Id. at 322. The
Court could just as well have used "schools" or "learning institutions" in lieu of
"universities" if it intended a broad interpretation. Fourth, any potential benefits that
flow from Grutter's diversity rationale, even if valid, are not pressing enough to
constitute an a fortiori compelling government interest because of the harm they
create. Schools in a de facto segregated district are generally far from being
qualitatively fungible. Thus, if the quality of education provided at any given school is
inherently unequal, the school district would be harming any child that is denied
admission to one of its schools. The harm is substantial as employment opportunities
for minorities, as for all groups, are closely related to educational opportunities. See
SCHILLER, supra note 110, at 192-93 (discussing some of the disparate outcomes
resulting from racial discrimination in schools).
425.
Residential racial segregation in the top fifty U.S. metropolitan areas
remains high and has changed very little since the 1980s. See, e.g., LEWIS MUMFORD
CTR., ETHNIC DIVERSITY GRows, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND (2001),

http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf.
426.
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Korernatsu marked the first time that a
heightened level of scrutiny-strict scrutiny was applied in the Supreme Court's
history. The idea of levels of scrutiny under constitutional law originated from a
footnote that appeared in a case six years earlier. See United States v. Carolene
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decree whereby Americans of Japanese descent were evacuated and
interned in camps during World War II.427 The Court upheld the
racial classification of Japanese-Americans and declared that the
government could take whatever steps were necessary to "prevent
espionage and sabotage." 428 More importantly, the Court approached
the equal protection challenge in a new light, holding that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect" and warrant the use of "the most rigid
scrutiny." 429 The Court found that "racial antagonism" could never
justify racial classifications that burden a particular group of
people, 430 but a "pressing public necessity," such as a threat to
national security during a time of war, could justify racial
restrictions. 431
Hence, Korematsu created a national security
exception to the Fourteenth Amendment. The case has been highly
criticized because of the overinclusiveness of the racial classification
and the unfair imprisonment of Japanese-Americans. 4 32 However,
Korematsu's holding regarding strict scrutiny, and the national
security exception it created, remains the law of the land. 433
In 1989, the Supreme Court declared that affirmative action
programs should be examined under strict scrutiny. 434 For nearly
five decades, since the inception of Brown and its progeny, the
Supreme Court endorsed a narrow interpretation of what constitutes
a compelling governmental interest that survives strict scrutiny. 435
Under this interpretation, no use of race was sufficiently compelling
to justify preferential treatment unless it was instituted to remedy

Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("It is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation."). Carolene Products applied a rational basis standard
of review to the federal law in question, and merely suggested in dicta, that various
degrees of judicial scrutiny may be appropriate under different circumstances. Id. at
152-53.
427.
See id. at 216-23.
428.
Id. at 217.
429.
Id. at 216.
430.
Id. at 217.
431.
Id. at 216.
432.

See WILLIAM R. MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 300-01 (1974)

(providing a narrative of the deplorable conditions at the Japanese internment camps).
433.
ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE 62 (2d ed.
2006).
434.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("[T]he purpose of
strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.").
435.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that preservation
of limited state resources is not a compelling government interest that survives strict
scrutiny).
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the present effects of past discrimination. 436 However, this narrow
interpretation widened when Grutter held that viewpoint diversity is
a compelling interest that justifies the limited use of race in
institutions of higher education. 437 Grutter's brand of strict scrutiny
found an interest in obtaining a "critical mass" 438 of minority
students to achieve the benefits of student body diversity. 439
Grutter rejected the notion that the remedial purpose was the
only compelling interest that could survive strict scrutiny. For the
first time in history, the Court applied a more relaxed approach to
diversity in education. 4 40 Grutter distinguished strict scrutiny for
compensatory purposes from strict scrutiny for benign purposes, and
this distinction created a new exception to the Equal Protection
Clause.
B. Johnson Carves Another Exception to the
FourteenthAmendment
A little less than two years after Grutter, the Supreme Court
again altered equal protection law in Johnson v. California.44 1
Johnson involved a constitutional challenge to the California

436.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
437.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) ("[W]e endorse Justice
Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify
the use of race in university admissions.").
438.
Id. at 330. The Court defined critical mass "by reference to the educational
benefits that diversity is designed to produce." Id.
439.
The law school listed the following among its objectives: the "goal of
assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly
diverse," id. at 329; the desire to bolster classroom discussion and make it "livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting," id. at 330; the search for
applicants that would contribute "to the intellectual and social life of the institution,"
id. at 315; and "to provide adequate opportunities for the type of interaction upon
which the educational benefits of diversity depend; and to challenge all students to
think critically and examine stereotypes," id. at 380.
440.
The complexity and importance of Grutter's holding is, without doubt, a
reflection of the topic addressed. The flexible approach to strict scrutiny employed by
the Court was possible because the Court acknowledged that education "is the very
foundation of good citizenship," Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and
vitally important in maintaining the "fabric of society." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. Justice
Powell's flexible approach to equal protection analysis persuaded the Grutter Court.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-26. As a strong ally of equality in education, Justice Marshall
believed that education is a fundamental right and, therefore, should be granted
special protections in the Constitution. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is necessary to
afford protection to interests interrelated with specific constitutional guarantees).
Marshall's opinions in Rodriguez and Plyler suggest that he would have applauded
Grutter but regretted PICS.
441.
543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) ("The 'necessities of prison security and discipline'
are a compelling government interest justifying only those uses of race that are
narrowly tailored to address those necessities.").
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Department of Corrections (CDC) policy of segregating prisoners on
the basis of race for up to two months following their arrival. 442
During this time, the CDC would assign cellmates, and inmates of
different races were almost never placed together. 443 The statesponsored racial segregation of inmates applied only to the prisoners'
cells. 444 All other areas in the state prison were fully integrated. 445
After the first two months of imprisonment, the state allowed
prisoners to select their own cellmates, regardless of race. 446
In a 5-3 decision, 447 the Court affirmed the applicability of the
strict scrutiny standard of review for racial classifications, rather
than a "reasonably related to legitimate penological interest"
standard. 448 In addition, the Court held that the "necessities of
prison security and discipline" constitute a compelling government
interest that justifies the narrowly tailored use of race. 449 The CDC
justified its discriminatory policy by reference to racial violence
among the prison gangs and argued, successfully, that it was
essential to "segregate all inmates while it determines whether they
pose a danger to others." 450 Following Grutter's approach to strict
scrutiny, Johnson recognized another new compelling interest to
justify racial segregation.
C. Finding Needles in a Haystack-Carvinga
New Integration Exception
Grutter and Johnson altered the equal protection landscape.
After decades of Fourteenth Amendment litigation, the Court found
only one interest sufficiently compelling to justify racial
discrimination: the remedy of past discrimination. However, Grutter
and Johnson marked the beginning of what appears to be a new
willingness to find compelling interests that survive strict scrutiny. 45 1

442.
Id. at 502.
443.
Id. at 503.
444.
Id.
445.
Id.
446.
Id.
447.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in Johnson. Id. at 501.
448.
Id. at 509-10.
449.
Id. at 512.
450.
Id. at 503.
451.
Indeed, in a 2006 Supreme Court decision, at least four Justices (Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Roberts) declared their readiness to find a compelling governmental
interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws. See League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 518 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing
alleged violations of a congressional redistricting plan on equal protection and Voting
Rights Act grounds).

1332

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

/VOL. 43:1265

There are currently four-and potentially siX452-compelling
interests that justify the limited use of race: national security,
remedial measures against past discrimination, diversity in higher
education, and penal security.
Certainly, any addition to this list of compelling interests
requires constitutional justification. The Supreme Court can rely not
only on the importance of diversity in American schools, but also on
the trend of constitutional theory found in its rulings in Grutter and
Johnson to carve a new "integration exception" to the Equal
Protection Clause. 45 3 The new integration exception would derive
from the benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically integrated
student body in K-12 schools.
However, this new trend is only one of several weapons in the
Court's arsenal that supports a compelling interest in diversity in K12 education. The PICS opinions focused on the current crisis in the
United States' private housing patterns. 454 As the dissent correctly
indicated, distinguishing between the causes of segregation to
determine what is constitutionally permitted or prohibited is an
exercise in futility.4 55 It makes no difference that segregation is a
monster with two faces-one de jure and another de facto. Splitting
hairs to debate whether the Equal Protection Clause merely
proscribes segregation, or whether it also requires or permits
integration, as the Justices did in PICS, does not alleviate the harms
created by separation of the races. Instead, the Court should expand
its reasoning by utilizing another weapon from the arsenal: America's
path to a diminished standing in the international community.
With more and more frequency, experts report that the United
States appears to be lagging behind other modern societies in the
field of education. 456
These experts suggest that America's
international influence will decrease when the unskilled underclass it
is raising matures. 457 Diversity in education plays a crucial role in
this discussion because de facto segregation creates and perpetuates

452.
The other two interests that have fallen one vote short of compelling status
in recent years are the interest of achieving a fully-integrated student body in K 12
education, see Part I.C (discussing Parents Involved); and the interest of complying
with federal antidiscrimination laws, see supra note 451 and accompanying text.
453.
Arguably, PICS concentrated on only two interests-remedial measures
and higher education viewpoint diversity-because those are the only ones applicable
in the education setting thus far. However, the trend I point to is not constricted to a
particular area of the law. Rather, it demonstrates that Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence has experienced surprising transformations in recent years.
454.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
712 (2007) (noting that the segregated nature of Seattle's housing pattern results in de
facto segregation in the city's public schools).
455.
Id. at 820.
456.
PACINO, supra note 171, at 31.
457.
Id.
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an underclass of minorities. 4 58 It is no coincidence that the schools
with the least resources, staffing, adequate funding, and measurable
achievements are those predominantly attended by segregated
minority pupils. 45 9 America operates some of the best K-12 schools
in the world, but it also runs too many schools that are dismal
compared to the schools of other nations. 460 The new era of
globalization is forcing the world to reassess curricular policies and
old school system structures that impede the advancement of
diversity in education. 461 For this reason, jurists and policy makers
should avail themselves of the benefits of metanationalism. 462
It is in the interest of the United States to examine the failures
and successes of school systems around the world. For example, it
would be useful for jurists and scholars to examine Finland's
approach to multiculturalism. The Scandinavian nation sits at the
zenith of the international league tables on comparable tests of
reading, math, and science. Moreover, it has an excellent record,
compared to other European nations, of instituting diversity policies
to integrate children of immigrants and refugees. 463
Using metanationalism, the Court might discover that America's
problem with diversity in education is not exclusively American.
Both developing and developed nations realize the importance-or
compelling nature-of diversity in the era of globalization. 464 Hence,
to justify an integration exception, the Court could apply its evolving

458.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
that segregation in education will result in "the creation of an underclass of future
citizens").
459.
SCHILLER, supra note 110, at 194. A disproportionately high number of
Black and Latino children attend schools with at least 50 percent minority enrollment.
The resegregation trend of the American school system is alarming. Nearly 80 percent
of Latinos and 73 percent of Blacks attend predominantly minority schools, compared
to 55 percent and 77 percent respectively in 1968. Id. tbl.11.1, at 195. The Latino
dropout rate is also the highest in the country at 24 percent. Id. at 193. The higher
percentage of segregation corresponding to Latinos could be attributed to the fact that

Latinos face segregation by language in addition to segregation by race and class.
460.
GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING
RESEGREGATION,

AND

THE

NEED

FOR

NEW

INTEGRATION

STRATEGIES

8,

http://civilrightsproject.ucla.eduresearch/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historicreversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfieldhistoric-reversals-accelerating.pdf.
461.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
462.
See discussion supra PartIII.C.
463.
Christopher R. Bagley, Crisis, Rhetoric and Progress in Education for the
Inclusion of Diverse Ethnic and Social Groups, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 13, at 195, 199-200.
464.
Compare id. (explaining the commitment of Finland and Britain to
ethnically integrated educational systems), with Jha, supra note 420, at 40-41
(explaining India's effort to provide equal education to all of its citizens).
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jurisprudence regarding international law to recognize diversity in
education as a global compelling interest.
America has changed over the last two centuries. Today's
America is culturally and ethnically rich, and it is part of a global
society that thrives in unity. 465 The United States cannot afford to
continue its pattern of resegregation, under which a small elite class
has access to a quality education, while an underclass of minorities
remains ill equipped to face the challenges of the future. 466 Diversity
at early stages of life can teach children to function in a pluralistic
society. More importantly, it can help to eradicate the need for
affirmative action programs in the future. 467 If everyone starts with
the same opportunities, affirmative assistance by states would no
longer be justifiable on racial grounds. 468 Indeed, increasing diversity
in elementary education could mark the overdue beginning of the end
for all racial preferences in education and other areas. Contrary to
the Court's holding in Grutter, it is delusional to believe that an
abstract concept baptized as a sunset provision will end affirmative
action in the year 2028.469 Without a K-12 integration exception, the
more plausible scenario is one experienced by other nations, where
race-based preferential policies become akin to a stubborn trick
candle that reignites itself over and over again. 470

465.
Today, minorities account for almost one-third of the U.S. population and
by 2042, minorities are expected to become the majority. Press Release, U.S. Census
Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/012496.html.
In the next twelve years, more than half the youth population will be of minority
origin. Id.
466.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
that segregation in education will result in "the creation of an underclass of future
citizens").
467.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("[P]rogress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it
safe to sunset affirmative action.").
468.
See id. at 344 (noting that once the objectives of affirmative action
programs are achieved, the programs should be terminated).
469.
Not much has changed since Grutterin terms of minority enrollment in law
school or closing the gap in LSAT scores, and there is no recent evidence to suggest
things will change during the next decade. See Susan P. Dalessandro et al., LSAT
Performance with Regional, Gender, and Racial/Ethnic Breakdowns: 2001-2002
Through 2007-2008 Testing Years 13 (LSAC Research Report Series, 2009) (reporting
the virtually unchanged mean and standard deviation LSAT scores for minorities since
2001); Matriculants by Ethnic and Gender Group, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL,
http://www.1sac.org/LSACResources/Data/vs-ethnic-gender-matrics.asp
(last visited
Oct. 15, 2010) (indicating that in the past decade, the percentage of minority law school
matriculants has increased, but only slightly).
470.
For example, India, the first modern nation to institute positive
discrimination policies, had provisions in its original constitution whereby preferential
action would expire in twenty years. SOWELL, supra note 144, at 23. However, those
policies have been extended repeatedly despite evidence that they disproportionately
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Critics might argue that carving another exemption to the
Fourteenth Amendment would only chip away at its integrity until it
is left fragile and obsolete. But there is no reason to believe that the
judiciary will use a carefully conceived and narrow exception as the
basis to fabricate unfounded interests. 471 To the contrary, if the
Court speaks with candor and moral clarity, it will encourage honesty
in school districts' efforts to prevent resegregation. 472 Lastly, a
compelling interest to promote integration would give the Supreme
Court an opportunity to revisit the second prong of strict scrutiny visA-vis diversity in K-12 institutions. 473 Clear guidance from the Court
on all fronts of strict scrutiny would ensure that race-conscious public
school admissions programs do not exceed the Fourteenth
Amendment's powerful mandate against discrimination.

CONCLUSION

The pursuit of racial and ethnic diversity is a laudable goal
worthy of constitutional compelling treatment. This Article uses
diversity in education as a putative framework for evolving
constitutional jurisprudence.
To that end, it conceptualizes
metanationalism, a theory that provides the context necessary to
understand the rationale behind analyzing social problems using both
a domestic and an international perspective. In addition, this piece

benefit the most fortunate members of a disadvantaged group while ignoring the less
fortunate, who do not know how to take advantage of the policies designed to help
them. Id. at 48-49. Similarly, Pakistan, which began positive discrimination in 1949,
repeatedly renewed preferential policies meant to expire in five to ten years. Id. at 5.
471.
See infra note 473 and accompanying text.
472.
In essence, PICS compels districts to mask assignment plans to achieve
racial integration under the disguise of constitutionally sanctioned criteria such as
language or socioeconomic status. Furthermore, courts considering whether to lift
judicial supervision from school districts still operating under court order might delay a
district's release if integration efforts become illegal overnight. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 722, 856 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that courts would hesitate to find unitary status if student assignment
plans in segregated districts would be legal one day and illegal the next).
473.
Although the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is still relevant to the diversity discussion. The current five
hallmarks of the narrowly tailored analysis set forth in Grutter have proved
problematic in the K-12 context. All lower courts that have examined the issue of
diversity in K-12 schools (ParentsIntolved, McFarland,Comfort, and Cavalier) struck
down the integration plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Ironically,
although the PICS plurality found Grutter inapplicable in K-12 institutions, it spent
the bulk of its opinion explaining how the plans failed to comply with Grutter's specific
brand of narrow tailoring. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 722, 724. Strict scrutiny under
Grutter's jurisprudence renders voluntary plans an exercise in futility. Therefore, a
new integration exception, accompanied by narrowly tailored criteria fit for elementary
and secondary public schools would ensure diversity in our children's classrooms.
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explores the universal human problem of diversity, suggesting that it
now constitutes a global compelling interest. This proposition is
proven by examining the benefits of diversity, as well as the effects of
multiculturalism in educational policies cemented by globalization,
from a domestic and global standpoint. In this era of global
pluralism, societies cannot afford to analyze complex issues affecting
the world with a myopic lens. Surely, diversity in education posits
difficult challenges not amenable to simple solutions. However, these
challenges present an opportunity to promote a blueprint of
constructive
social architecture that respects constitutional
principles.
Thus, this Article aims to redefine the normative
approach to global problems and open new pathways for
interdisciplinary research to resolve them.

